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Abstract 
Telecommunications has gained in importance in the world economy. Regulation of 
this industry therefore has become a crucial policy issue of the governments around 
the world. In the thesis, I examine regulation of telecommunications services in OECD 
countries. Special attention is given to the New Zealand regulatory regimes before and 
after the second regulatory reform. As the first regulatory reform in telecommunications 
in New Zealand occurred over a decade ago, regulatory measures had to be adjusted 
to suit the current environment. This was the main reason for the establishment of 
a government-mandated inquiry. Measures were sought and evaluated to reduce or 
eliminate problems that were associated with the old regime, especially the not-very-
productive commercial negotiations and the not-very-efficient process and the institution 
that operators relied on for solving their disputes. I use Coase Theorem to examine why 
commercial negotiations did not work as effectively as the government envisaged. With 
the adjustments of regulatory institutions and their functions, the government wishes to 
counter the time-consuming dispute resolution process that works against new entrants, 
and to increase the incentive to negotiate. The second regulatory reform shifted the 
regulatory burden from the courts to the industry and the Commerce Commission. 
Comparisons of the two regimes are made to analyse the differences of the two regimes 
to achieve better understanding of the social and economic goals of the New Zealand 
government. The two regimes are evaluated to provide information on the potential 
problems that might emerge in the future. Topics such as the difficulties a regulator 
faces in imposing appropriate regulatory measures, the direct relationships of regulation 
and competition and the indirect relationships of regulation and telecommunications 
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performance are analysed in depth. 
2 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Telecommunications can be broadly defined as communications by satellite, cable, 
telegraph, telephone, radio or television. However, to simplify and limit the scope of the 
discussions, "telecommunications" will refer to communications by telephone network 
throughout the paper. 
The telecommunications sector has gone through a period of deregulation since 1980s 
in many countries. The goal of the deregulation of the non-natural monopoly segments 
of the telecommunications services has been to enhance competition. However, due to 
the specificity and complexity of the industry, the incumbents have had enough market 
power to deter entry, and to engage in anti-competitive business practices. The incum-
bent has the potential and the incentive to make competition as empty as mere words 
without proper constraints imposed by the regulator. This has been a serious prob-
lem especially when the incumbents were usually state-owned monopolies with 100 % 
market share at the beginning of the liberalisation phase. Denying the entrants' access 
to the incumbent's local loop that connects to the end-users can virtually wipe out all 
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competitors at the time when wiring up the basic network infrastructure is extremely 
costly. Technological innovations such as fibre optics have enabled the entrants to build 
their own local exchanges with partial coverage that encompasses the most profitable 
routes. However, as long as the competitors cannot build full-coverage local networks, 
the interconnection problem will remain a crucial regulatory issue. It may be econom-
ically undesirable to wire up a full coverage network because of the inefficiency caused 
by excess capital investment, which produces excess capacity compared to the consumer 
demand. Therefore, the regulatory authority should at least establish the entrants' right 
to interconnect before the commercial negotiations can proceed. The predatory pric-
ing practice in the final service market is a common worry for the regulator as well. 
The essentiality of the interconnection gives the incumbent more tools to play rough. 
Therefore, the prices that the incumbent can charge for terminating calls and for final 
telephone services are often dealt with by means of variant price regulations. How-
ever, the interconnection problem is not just about prices, and issues such as number 
portability can have significant impact on competition. 
(, The term "interconnection" is defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) as "the way which networks are connected to allow traffic to 
pass between them including the conveyance of traffic on the network of one carrier on 
behalf of another carrier or service provider". It encompasses the direction and the sym-
metry of traffic. The direction of traffic refers to the origination and the termination of 
calls. The symmetry refers to the nature of interconnection; the connection of two bot-
tlenecks (bilateral or two-way interconnection) or the connection between a bottleneck 
and a non-bottleneck (unilateral or one-way interconnection). On the physical level, it 
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includes linkages between and among various entities and industries. In telephone net-
works, the physical interconnection can be found between the incumbent and new local 
telephone companies, traditional and competing long distance carriers, mobile carriers 
and their access to spectrum, domestic and international carriers, dedicated "private" 
networks of organisations and user groups and internet backbones. The local exchange 
carrier (LEC) has been the most prominent and sole supplier of the access (to the end-
users) services in the past, and it continues to be that in most OECD countries. Fibre 
optics, wireless technology and digital electronics have enabled competitors to enter 
the local exchange market in more Rrofitable routes. This has accelerated competition 
in the "last mile". Although, in most cases the impact on market structure of more 
competitors entering the local exchange market is not obvious. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature ad-
dressing interconnection issues in telecommunications. It is separated into four sections. 
The first section covers the price regulation for retail services. The second section re-
views pricing principles of interconnection that are relevant in New Zealand. The third 
section relates to the regulatory reform. The fourth section concerns the creation of 
competition. Chapter 3 outlines the basic interconnection problem. It explains why 
regulatory intervention is necessary in creating effective competition. Chapter 4 ex-
amines how the regulatory environment and the scope of market liberalisation affect 
telecommunications performance such as price, quality and productivity. Chapter 5 
provides an overview and details of the regulatory settings of OECP member countries 
to complement the numerical analysis in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 describes the state of 
the New Zealand telecommunications industry, including its current industry structure 
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and the governing laws and institutions of the industry. The Ministerial Inquiry, the 
government's decisions concerning the Inquiry's recommendations, the introduction of 
the Telecommunications Act and its passage will be briefly recounted. Chapter 7 is a 
simple analysis of why the original light-handed regulatory regime that was based on 
voluntary negotiations would not work in New Zealand. The analysis is focused on the 
incumbent's incentive to negotiate. The violation of some assumptions of the Coase 
theory will provide insights into why the voluntary negotiations fail to deliver results in 
a fair and timely fashion. In Chapter 8, I describe and compare the regulatory regimes 
resulting from the first and second regulatory reforms in telecommunications in New 
Zealand. For simplicity, I will call the regulatory regime resulting from the first reform 
"the old regime" and from the second reform "the new regime". The problems of the 
old regime and potential problems that might face the new regime are also analysed in 
Chapter 8 based on what happened in New Zealand in the past decade and on regulation 
theory. Chapter 9 concludes and offers areas of future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The literature review in this chapter consists of four parts. The first and second 
parts are related to the regulation of retail prices and interconnection prices. In the 
first part, traditional rate-of-return and some popular forms of incentive regulation lit-
erature is reviewed. The second part of the literature review relates to interconnection 
pricing rules and principles that are relevant in New Zealand. Before the passage of 
the Telecommunications Bill 2001 (the old regulatory regime), the highest court in New 
( Zealand upheld the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) for setting interconnection 
charges. With the passage of the Telecommunications Bill (the new regulatory regime), 
if commercial negotiations fall apart, the Telecommunications Commissioner can apply 
either the cost-based total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC) or bill and keep if 
appropriate to resolve pricing disputes. Literature related to the three pricing principles 
is thus explored here. Although price regulation is not a permanent feature in the New 
Zealand regulatory regime, its application is quite common among OECD countries as 
a means to control the incumbent's or the dominant operator's market power and to en-
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hance social welfare. Twenty-six out of twenty-seven OECD member countries regulate 
retail prices and nineteen out of twenty-four countries regulate interconnection prices 
for basic voice services (long-distance communications domestic and international). It is 
believed that price regulation is a useful tool in fostering competition, especially when 
competition has just been initiated. 
The third part of the literature review is related to issues of regulatory reform. Is-
sues of regulatory reform may include the design of the legal environment; the use and 
application of regulatory instruments; the works of governing institutions; the setup of 
codes for industry self regulatory activities and the assessment of regulatory regimes 
by their ability to achieve pre-defined goals, etc. However, I will limit the scope of the 
literature review to discussions on different regulatory regimes, especially those among 
the OECD countries. At least two economic factors contributed to the reform movement 
in the 1980s and 1990s. First, there was a growing awareness of the inefficiency of the 
incumbent monopolists. Second, technological change created a force toward deregu-
lation. Regulatory reform is not just institutional, it is also about the change to how 
both the regulators and regulated carriers interact. The regulatory reform emphasises 
the importance of economic incentives. Therefore, it is not a strict form of regulation. 
By aligning the interests of regulators and regulated firms, the goals of government can 
be achieved with fewer administrative costs. 
The fourth part of the literature review is related to competition matters. I will re-
view literature which summarises the challenge facing the regulators in promoting com-
petition and the factors that influence how quickly facilities-based competition emerges. 
Due to the fact that deregulation movement and hence the accomplished regulatory 
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reform were aimed at promoting and maintaining effective competition, understanding 
the problem of creating effective competition can get us insights on what regulatory 
measures should be applied and of what we should be aware when designing the proper 
regulation structure with respect to instruments. 
2.1 Retail Price Regulation 
The deregulation in telecommunication markets around the world has led to the 
privitisation of the previously state-owned enterprises and the abolition of entry barri-
ers. However, in most countries, the government has been reluctant to hand over all 
controls and give the market free rein. Measures to control telecommunications mar-
ket, such as licensing requirements, price regulation and disclosure of information on 
interconnection agreements, are commonplace (Min 2000, Gonenc, Maher and Nicoletti 
2000, Boylaud and Nicoletti 2000). Price regulation, which has been widely applied to 
telecommunications services, puts limits on the price a network operator can charge for 
its interconnection and/or retail services. The regulatory reform presents a whole new 
regulation epoch. The traditional rate-of-return price regulation is gradually replaced 
by incentive based price regulation such as price caps. 
The United States is a leading character in telecommunications deregulation. Ac-
cordingly, it is also the leading character in implementing price regulation in its various 
forms. Many discussions on price regulation are therefore based on the experience of the 
United States (Einhorn 1991, Sappington and Weisman 1996, Vogelsang and Mitchell 
1997). Cost-based (also called "cost-plus" or "rate-of~return") price regulation has been 
the dominant method of price regulation for many years. However, this method evokes 
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much dissatisfaction among both regulators and academics. Under cost-based price reg-
ulation, prices are designed to recover the cost of the regulated firms plus an allowed 
rate of return on the full value of their capital. Therefore it is focused on establishing 
a reasonable limit on a network operator's profits. Such system provides only lim-
ited incentive for cost reduction effort and the introduction of new services (Einhorn 
1991, Sappington and Weisman 1996, and Church and Ware, 2000). Owing to their full 
cost-recovery nature, the regulated monopolies have little incentive to manage inputs 
efficiently or to adopt cost-reducing innovations (Einhorn, 1991). Because the regula-
tors will base allowed prices on the reported cost data, regulated carriers would have 
strong incentives to misrepresent their reported cost data to get higher prices or rate of 
return (Einhorn, 1991). The tendency for a regulated firm to misrepresent cost data in 
the reports make it impossible for regulators to regulate prices effectively. Therefore, 
the social welfare will be reduced as a consequence. Under rate-of-return price regula-
tion, there is a potential for the regulated firms to expand their capital uneconomic ally. 
However, on the good side, it provides assurance to firms that their investments in sunk 
facilities could be recovered. The certainty of being able to recover the cost of invest-
ments can encourage timely investments. Furthermore its process is well understood 
and provides for public input and participation (Church and Ware, 2000). 
Today, alternatives to rate-of-return price regulation are commonplace. These al-
ternatives exist in different forms and are generally called incentive regulation. The 
incentive-based regulation is used as a means to encourage efficiency, protect consumer 
welfare, stimulate technological innovation and reduce administrative costs. The ex-
periments on incentive regulation are often a result of dissatisfaction with the outcome 
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under cost-based price regulation, especially the lack of incentive for cost minimisation 
(Church and Ware, 2000). Many variants of incentive regulation have been extensively 
adopted in the United States and many other countries. Price cap, earnings sharing and 
revenue sharing are arguably the most popular forms of incentive regulation. 
The central idea behind price cap regulation is to control the prices charged by the 
regulated firm, rather than its earnings (Sappington and Weisman, 1996). Price cap 
mechanism includes the following features (Acton and Vogelsang, 1989): The price ceil-
ings are imposed on each product of a regulated firm and the firm can charge any price 
below the ceiling. The price ceiling need not be product specific. An average price ceil-
ing can be applied to a basket of goods, which gives companies the freedom to set the 
relative prices of their products. The feasibility for a regulated firm to charge relative 
prices for its product provides room for cross-subsidisation. The price ceiling is adjusted 
in the short run by using a formula that accounts for both inflation and expected pro-
ductivity. In essence, price cap regulation plans require the regulated firm's average real 
prices to fall annually by a specified percentage. This percentage is commonly referred 
to as the X-factor. The X-factor represents the percentage reduction in prices that the 
firm is deemed capable of implementing without jeopardising its financial integrity (Sap-
pington and Weisman, 1996); In the long run the price cap is periodically reviewed and 
updated. The price cap provides high powered incentives and delivers reasonably good 
performance if the conditions are static and the regulator is well informed. However, 
the performance of a price cap is not so desirable in a dynamic and uncertain world. 
When prices do not track costs, price cap results in allocative inefficiency (Church and 
Ware, 2000). Concerns have been expressed that the incentive for cost minimisation 
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may also imply an incentive to reduce the quality of services. Empirical studies show 
mixed results with the United States and Great Britain (Kridal, Sappington and Weis-
man, 1996) and therefore there is no sure answer for the claim that price caps result in 
impaired quality. There is a commitment problem both with the regulator and the firm. 
The high-power incentives under price caps depend upon the firm's belief that any cost 
reduction effort by them will not result in a tightening of its price cap. Studies show 
that it is almost impossible for a regulator to make such a commitment. 
An earnings sharing plan provides a regulated firm with expanded earnings flexibility 
but requires the firm to share a portion of the extra earnings (profits) it generates 
with its customers and/or the government (Sappington and Weisman, 1996). This plan 
provides the firm with some protection against being held up. Sharing provides gains 
to consumers and therefore it is less likely that there will be political pressure on the 
regulator to renege on its promise. The incumbent can also be protected against a new 
entrant by sharing earnings with the regulator and consumers (Weisman, 1994). 
Sometimes a revenue sharing plan is called for instead of an earnings sharing plan. 
Under revenue sharing plans, revenues instead of profits in excess ofthe target are shared. 
The basic rationale underlying both earnings and revenue sharing plans is the same. A 
firm can share the extra profits if they can produce more cost effectively than expected, 
therefore it provides ample incentive for cost-reduction. However, because the firms 
share their profits with their customers and the government, their profits rise only by 
some proportion of any decline in costs. Therefore, the firm's incentive to undertake the 
diligent effort and sacrifice required to reduce production costs is diminished (Sappington 
and Weisman, 1996). The plan has the same effect as taxing profits. 
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2.2 Interconnection Price Regulation 
2.2.1 Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
Baumol and Willig's "efficient component pricing rule" for interconnection explicitly 
states that an entrant seeking access to a local network in order to compete in the final 
goods market should compensate the incumbent for the incremental costs (the resource 
costs for providing the interconnection) plus the opportunity cost of the net revenue 
foregone by the incumbent in the final goods market (Vogelsang and Mitchell, 1997). 
The ECPR guarantees full cost recovery for the incumbent. The full cost recovery 
property of ECPR relieves the regulatory body from the burden of having to adopt 
other measures to finance these costs (common and joint cost, cost of universal service, 
etc) and from the risk of further distortions or deadweight losses. ECPR is designed to 
exclude any entry that is less efficient than the incumbent in the production of services 
in "non-natural monopoly" segment of the market (Laffont and Tirole 2000, Church and 
Ware 2000). This implies that the ECPR works well in achieving productive efficiency. 
Another benefit of ECPR is that the incumbent does not have an incentive to erect 
entry barriers when ECPR is applied. ECPR requires that the bottleneck carrier is 
indifferent between handling all the business (traffic) itself and cooperating with the 
connecting carriers. ECPR preserves the incumbent's monopoly profits, so it does not 
have to block entry to defend its profits by denying the interconnection. These two 
benefits together imply that ECPR can improve or at the minimum maintain the current 
welfare because it only allows for efficient entry (Noam, 2001). 
The ECPR is a sound theory but its applicability is limited in the real world. It 
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holds as a first-best pricing principle only if a stringent set of assumptions holds: the 
monopolist's price for the complementary (non-bottleneck) service has been based on a 
marginal cost pricing rule; the monopolist's and rival producer's components are perfect 
substitutes; the production technology of the component experiences constant returns 
to scale; the rival producer has no market power; and the monopolist's marginal cost of 
production of the component can be accurately observed (Economides and White 1995). 
The assumptions under which ECPR would deliver efficiencies do not necessarily hold 
in telecommunications industry. 
The ECPR works well only when applying to a perfectly competitive or contestable 
market (Mueller, 1998). The provider of interconnection has to offer the final product 
at a rate established in a competitive market, so that the interconnector does not have 
to compensate the incumbent for the loss of its monopoly profits due to entry. However, 
the telecommunications industry is neither perfectly competitive nor contestable. The 
incumbent in telecommunications often possesses market power. Therefore, substan-
tial government regulation is essential to apply the rule in a non-competitive market. 
Without final price regulation, the rule gives the monopolist a property right to its 
monopoly rents. It protects the monopoly of any competitive losses. This is the "per-
petual monopoly profits" property of the ECPR discusses by Tye and Lapuerta (1996) 
and Economides and White (1995). 
The determination of interconnection charge for ECPR is based on the assumption 
that entrants will take over some of the incumbent's business and therefore reduce the 
incumbent's profits. However, not all the calls handled by the entrants will otherwise 
be handled by the incumbent (Noam, 2001). More entrants may intensify competition, 
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which causes the price of the final services to fall and/or better and new services to be 
provided. These have the effect of expanding the total number of calls, or the size of 
the telecommunications market. In other words, entry is not a zero sum game but a 
positive sum game. Both parties may benefit by the increase in market size. 
Under the ECPR, entry does not cause direct price reduction in the retail market 
unless the entrants have a cost advantage over the incumbent (Tye and Lapuerta, 1996). 
The ability of the price to fall is constrained because the entrant is obliged to compensate 
the incumbent for its lost monopoly profits. This obligation limits the extent to how 
much consumer surplus can increase. Entry under ECPR would not satisfy allocative 
efficiency. In other words, ECPR retains the contribution (margin over incremental cost) 
already present in the incumbent's retail services. Since these retail prices may have 
reflected monopoly conditions and/or regulatory subsidies, the rule ignores allocative 
economic efficiency (Hausman and Tardiff, 1995). 
In static efficiency the ECPR secures productive efficiency and fails to satisfy alloca-
tive efficiency. ECPR ignores some harmful effects it may pose onto dynamic efficiency. 
First, this pricing rule offers full cost recovery for the incumbent, and therefore the 
incumbent does not have the incentive to adopt cost-reducing technology or engage in 
cost-reducing innovations. Second, the rule precludes any inefficient entry but fails to 
consider that even an inefficient entrant may invest in capital or new technology, which 
gives dynamic efficiency gains (Noam, 2001). It is also argued by Economides and White 
(1995) that ECPR's exclusion of inefficient rivals may be socially harmful. The presence 
of an inefficient rival in the market could bring net social gain when the price reduction 
makes the net gain to consumers greater than the inefficiency costs of the rival's pro-
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duction. They also point out the possibility of an incumbent using ECPR to exclude a 
more efficient rival. It can do so by understating its own marginal costs of production of 
the complementary component (non-bottleneck) and by imposing a heightened ECPR 
on the rival. If the regulator cannot observe the incumbent's cost perfectly, the incum-
bent can claim that some production cost for the complementary component should be 
treated as the production cost of the bottleneck services. The lower marginal cost for 
the complementary component will then justify a higher access charge. 
The efficient component pricing rule has been used in the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand for telecommunications, and in America in Railroad cases (Noam, 2001). 
However, it is deemed an unpopular pricing rule for setting an interconnection fee in New 
Zealand telecommunications. The government clearly states its intention of promoting 
competition and improving consumer welfare, for which, ECPR fails its task. 
2.2.2 Total Service Forward-Looking Long-Run Average Incre-
mental Cost 
In a fully competitive market, long-term marginal cost pricing is optimal in terms 
of economic efficiency in the absence of market distortions. Incremental cost approx-
imates marginal cost when incremental cost is averaged over the increment (Noam, 
2001). Incremental cost pricing, like marginal cost pricing, covers the additional costs 
the incumbent incurred as a result of interconnection. It does not, however, cover the 
fixed investments of the incumbent. The presence of substantial fixed costs is typical 
in the telecommunications industry, and the incumbent has to be compensated for such 
investment. This implies a price higher than the short-run marginal cost. Long-run 
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incremental cost is therefore suggested for its ability to cover all costs, including capital 
equipment and plant, since all costs in the long-run are variable. The estimation of 
long-run incremental cost can be based either on historic costs (the actual cost incurred 
to build the network) or future (forward-looking) costs. 
Forward-looking long-run average incremental cost (LRIC) has become quite popular 
among regulators as an interconnection pricing rule in recent years. It is used commonly 
in the United States, the United Kingdom and the continental European countries (Laf-
font and Tirole, 2000). There are two variants to LRIC: Total Service Long-Run In-
cremental Costs (TSLRIC) and Total Element Long-Run Incremental Costs (TELRIC). 
Both TSLRIC and TELRIC require using a hypothetical engineering model to calculate 
the total costs when the most efficient modern technology is utilised. The total cost for 
TSLRIC relates to the building of a system (access service) from scratch, and can be 
applied to the bundled wholesale services. The total cost for TELRIC relates to the un-
bundled elements (eg. switching, signaling, customer database) that are used to provide 
the service. TELRIC has increased in importance after it has been adopted in many 
states in the United States (many local loops are unbundled to several "elements"). 
Similar methodologies are adopted for the deregulated telecommunication industry in 
many other countries. 
In the new regulatory regime in New Zealand telecommunications, if voluntary nego-
tiation cannot resolve the pricing disputes between access seeker and providers, they can 
seek a determination from the Telecommunications Commissioner. One of the prescribed 
pricing principles that the Telecommunications Commissioner can apply to solve dispute 
is TSLRIC. In New Zealand, the incumbent's local loop is not unbundled, therefore "to-
17 
tal service" instead of "total element" long-run incremental cost is adopted. TSLRIC 
is defined within the Telecommunications Bill as: "the forward-looking costs over the 
long run of the total quantity of the facilities and functions that are directly attributed 
to, or reasonably identifiable as incremental to the service, taking into account the ser-
vice provider's provision of other telecommunications services; and includes a reasonable 
allocation of forward-looking common costs". Forward-looking common costs refers to 
"those economic costs efficiently incurred by the service provider in providing the service 
that cannot be attributed directly to providing an additional unit to that service" . 
Using LRIC results in low interconnection prices and therefore it is favoured by the 
entrants and regulators who wish for fiercer competition. If the goal of regulator is to 
develop local competition, a long-run incremental (marginal) cost type interconnection 
pricing rule may be most appropriate. The rule is beneficial to the entrants because 
it reduces or postpones their contribution to the fixed costs. If a regulator wants to 
speed up the entry into local competition, basing interconnection fees on the "forward-
looking" costs will further benefit the entrants. This is because future costs are always 
lower than historic costs under the realistic assumption that technology improves with 
time (Noam, 2001). 
LRIC gives the incumbent minimum profits for offering access to the local loop. 
Therefore, the incumbent has strong incentives to deter entry. Regulatory means is 
then needed to determine the entry conditions. The use of this methodology involves 
forecasting future demand and a good understanding of the scale of operations. The 
estimation bias for either demand or costs or both will lead to under- or over-estimation 
of costs and therefore the level of interconnection fees would not deliver optimal results. 
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This approach raises significant practical (as in estimation of different operational, cap-
ital costs and in estimation of demand, usage,etc) and administrative problems. 
Another problem of LRIC is that the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) does 
not compete with other providers but with a hypothetically efficient network (Noam, 
2001). If the incumbent becomes more efficient, then the LRIC will be adjusted down-
wards and it can charge less for the interconnection services. This gives the incumbent 
negative incentives in promoting efficiency. The computation of LRIC leaves regulators 
in charge of setting individual prices and therefore it is of discretionary nature. Because 
of that, it gives the regulator a key role for managing entry (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). 
All "forward-looking" cost basis for interconnection charges is criticised for not being 
able to cover total costs in most cases. It happens, especially, when in transition from 
the previous system that tended to under depreciate the capital investment. The price-
cost margin will vary among different customers and services. The use of "long-run 
incremental cost" attracts similar criticism of not being able to cover total costs. The 
inability to recover historic costs may lead to a deterioration of existing facilities as 
; LECs try to avoid the risk of unrecovered capital investment (Noam, 2001). 
Guthrie, Small and Wright (2000) formally analyse and compare forward and back-
ward looking cost rules. Given stochastic costs, it is concluded, forward-looking access 
prices retard investment and are dominated by access prices determined by historic cost 
whenever investment is desired, unless the cost of investment is trending upwards with 
low volatility. 
LRIC may lead to interconnection fees that are too low. This may discourage the 
entrant from building their own network. The construction of TSLRIC is designed to 
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cover the cost of building a network. If its goal is achieved, then the entrants should be 
indifferent between buying the service from the incumbent and building its own network. 
If entrants are diverted away from building its network, regulators should be extremely 
cautious in re-setting the proper interconnection charge. 
2.2.3 Bill and Keep 
Two carriers may decide not to charge each other for terminating calls. This usually 
happens when the two carriers' traffic is balanced and their networks are of similar size. 
Another reason for bill and keep is where the regulator wishes to support the entrants. 
A relatively even balance of traffic makes the access charge less relevant (Noam, 2001). 
If the termination charges they have to pay to each other are of similar magnitude, ~hey 
may agree to bill their own customers and keep all the revenues. This can save both 
of them administrative costs .. Bill and keep will give each carrier incentives to improve 
the efficiency of their own network. If one can operate more efficiently, it can keep all 
the profits from cost-reduction. However, carriers will try to increase their outgoing 
calls in relation to their incoming calls under bill and keep (Noam, 2001). They might 
divert the calls in such a way that the calls are terminated by their competitors even 
they can terminate them with less cost. This dumping traffic behaviour of one carriers 
gives other carriers incentives to degrade service in order to discourage loading from 
the other carrier. Applying bill and keep when terminating and originating usage is 
unbalanced leads to problems. The network with large originating usage can get most 
of the revenues. This enables it to cut rates and therefore leads to further increase in 
originating traffic. This outcome of bill and keep undermines its stability (Noam, 2001). 
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2.3 Regulatory Reform 
The regulatory reform in telecommunications services has focused on opening the 
previously monopolised markets to full competition over the last decade. It requires a 
different regulatory framework to cope with the more liberalised market. The changes 
of regulatory rules have led to a change in the role of regulatory institutions in telecom-
munications (Min 2000). The establishment of an independent ·regulator is the most 
visible institutional change among the OECD countries. The goal of having an indepen-
dent regulator, who is separate from the interest parties, is to ensure fair competition 
in the marketplace (Min 2000). Another important change is the growing involvement 
of competition authorities. This may raise issues of inconsistent jurisdiction, which will 
lead to uncertainty and thus create problems for business decision making. 
There is a broad consensus that the regulatory reform in telecommunications is ben-
eficial for both the consumers and businesses. Cross-country empirical evidence on the 
economic benefits of market and regulatory changes is still lacking, only a few studies 
(Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000) have attempted to look at these effects from a compara-
tive, OECD wide perspective. However, data used in Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) are 
quite recent and therefore the analysis may not be very robust. The reason why studies 
are focused on the performance measure of a single country is partly due to the deficiency 
of internationally comparable data. The myth concerning the link between regulatory 
regimes and telecommunications services performance remains unsolved. Boylaud and 
Nicoletti (2000) try to provide some insights into this problem. They find, generally 
speaking, that a more liberalised regulatory regime gives a better performance. How-
ever, construction of an index to present the degree of liberalisation is subject to the 
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availability of data and subjective selection of relevant factors. The definition of better 
performance is generally represented by a higher productivity, lower prices and higher 
service quality. 
Nicoletti (2000) looks at the patterns of regulation in service industries and explores 
their implications for service performance. The empirical evidence, including cross coun-
try analysis, suggests that regulatory reform could contribute substantially to improve 
economic performance and living standards in the OECD area. 
New Zealand's light-handed regulatory regime has been controversial. Despite the 
fact that the New Zealand government threatened further regulatory measures, volun-
tary negotiations have yet to deliver satisfactory outcomes. Aspects of the regime which 
have been less satisfactory include the cost of and delays in resolving litigation over in-
terconnection. This may have delayed and limited the benefits brought by competition. 
This, combined with the Privy Council's decision regarding local access, gave govern-
ment further thought on improvement measures. Interconnection has been a bitter issue 
between Telecom and Clear for eight years. After the maturity of the last interconnec-
tion contract and weeks long negotiations that ended in September 2001, Clear decided 
to leave the interconnection issues to the regulator when the new regulatory regime 
comes into effect at the end of 2001. 
2.4 Competition 
The regulatory reform in telecommunications industry has been mild so far. Domi-
nant firms have often been able to delay or prevent the onset of full competition (Shep-
hard, 1998). When there is a dominant firm in the market, there may not be enough 
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comparable rivals to ensure against collusive behaviour. The effects of competition 
largely depend upon the competitive power of the incumbent's rivak (Shephard 1998). 
Competition may be easier to ignite in the long-distance market where market prices 
for the final service are high owing to the inheritance of cross-subsidisation practised 
by the incumbent in pre-deregulation era. With the gaining of significant market power 
by the entrants, competition can take root and progress to many other segments of 
telecommunications markets. Therefore, in order to create effective competition, it is 
important to break or reduce monopoly power or to forestall its emergence. Spiller 
and Cardilli (1997) list four key building blocks that determine how quickly facilities-
based competition will emerge once the telecommunications sector is demonopolised: 
interconnection, equal access, unbundling and industry structure. Most literature gives 
interconnection focus attention (Laffont and Tirole 2000, Vogelsang and Mitchell 1997, 
Spiller and Cardilli, 1997). It is argued that the entrants' interconnection right should 
be established to facilitate competition. In New Zealand, the omission to establish inter-
connection rights for the entrants later resulted in serious adverse consequences (Spiller 
and Cardilli, 1997). Interconnection issues may include details such as pricing, location 
of points of interconnection, number portability and technological interface and so forth. 
The technical standards set by the owner of the local loop may also be used as a way 
to cut down the competitive power of its rival networks. Much thought has been given 
to the pricing of interconnection. Other interconnection issues have not been discussed 
much in the literature. This may because the pricing of interconnection is an economic 
problem while other issues are more technical and require specialist knowledge. 
The equal access problem is addressed by Spiller and Cardilli (1997). They exam-
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ine the telecommunications deregulation of four leading small countries: Chile, New 
Zealand, Australia and Guatemala. The four countries all pushed toward the goal of 
equal access. Drawing from Chile's experience, the transition to equal access would lead 
to a dramatic cut in prices and increased consumption of long-distance calls. 
Unbundling is not required in Australia, New Zealand and Chile. In Guatemala, 
however, instant competition was desired, and unbundling was used to facilitate tran-
sition to competition. What facilities should be unbundled and to what extent are 
sensitive issues. If services are unbundled too finely and rival carriers can resell the 
same service and still make a profit, the capital investment may be forestalled. This is 
the so called appropriablity problem discussed by Mueller (1998). The appropriablity 
problem can have serious consequences in the long run that even the dynamic efficiency 
improvement of competition cannot cure. 
The industry structure discussed by Spiller and Cardilli (1997) concerns two crucial 
choices. The first question is, whether or not the vertically integrated monopoly should 
be broken up. The second question is, what is the desirable extent of competition to 
be introduced into the market? It is well recognised that competition is beneficial in 
improving dynamic efficiency. However, it may erode the availability or the quality of 
the universal service if the holder of the local loop is not well compensated for the cost 
of providing that service. Countries with a small economy and thus small demand may 
not welcome two full-fledged network carriers in operation. The penetration rate of 
the incumbent may also affect the decisions by the regulators about the structure of 
telecommunications industry. 
24 
Chapter 3 
Interconnection Problem 
Chapter 3 examines the sources of an incumbent's market power and the way it uses 
such power to weaken its competitors' ability to compete through especially, the pricing 
and terms and conditions of interconnection. 
3.1 Sources of the Incumbent's Market Power Be-
fore Deregulation 
Prior to the deregulation, network facilities in telecommunications around the world 
were mostly under the control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Those SOEs were 
protected by statute, which gave them a legal monopoly status. The rationale supporting 
such strict government control that ~orms this specific market structure arose from the 
arguments of the natural monopoly. The legal barrier to entry sheltered the SOEs from 
the possible emergence of any rival service providers and therefore forestalled future 
competitive pressure. The possession of market power due to its monopoly status gave 
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the SOEs freedom to charge monopoly prices for their services and thus enabled them 
to enjoy monopoly profits even though their services may not have been tailored to 
meet the demand of their customers. Since the ongoing large profits of the statutory 
monopoly were safeguarded by laws, there was no need for them to produce or operate 
efficiently or in a cost effective manner. At the time, the variety of services was very 
restricted, the prices of telecommunications services were high and the quality of both 
the telecommunications service and customer service were inferior. Maurice P. McTigue 
(1996) describes the telecommunications disaster before the regulatory reform in New 
Zealand. In his words, 
"New Zealand's telephone operation was run by the Post Office, though no-
body seemed to know exactly why. No one could buy a telephone anywhere 
else in New Zealand, in fact it was illegal to do so. Customers had two 
choices - it was either a black phone or a white phone and they had a round 
dial on the front of them. Only the Post Office could provide fax machines. 
If you wanted a new line into your office or your home, it frequently took up 
to 6 months to get it. Breakdowns and repairs often would take as much as 
a week to be effected, and were always done by three men, even if the break-
down was only minor. Overloads were constant. Nearly every business day 
the telephone networks in the major centres would go to overload at about 
9 am and would remain overloaded at 2 pm. During this time, connecting 
to another party would take up to 20 minutes. Costs rose continually and, 
unfortunately, the management was thoroughly incompetent)). 
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This example gives us some idea of how the SOE managed its business and how it served 
its customers. 
3.2 Sources of the Incumbent's Market Power Af-
ter Deregulation and the Problems in Creating 
Effective Competition 
Competition was generally seen as the best way to increase consumer welfare and to 
improve both productive and allocative efficiency if the market be not overly distorted. 
It was also hoped that competition could bring about dynamic efficiency improvements 
induced by innovation and capital investment. To initiate competition in the telecom-
munications market, the removal of the legal barriers to entry was essential. Prompted 
by technological advances, the widespread deregulation transformed the telecommunica-
tions industry in 1980s. The change in technology meant that some parts of the vertical 
structure were not deemed natural monopolies anymore. Therefore, it was considered 
possible for governments to open up those parts of production for competitive pressure. 
In particular, the long distance market was thought to no longer be a natural monopoly 
and therefore competition was initiated in this segment in many countries. Effective 
competition has a potential to drive down the prices of services to reflect the under-
lying cost structure. Profit-maximising firms may try to differentiate their services in 
order to earn profits at least in the short run. The competitive pressure can also drive 
off telecommunication service providers who deliver low quality services if the market 
distortions are reduced to their minimum. 
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The introduction of competition into the telephone market is a complex issue. Prior 
to deregulation, most SOEs were vertically integrated natural monopolies, and therefore 
significant reconstruction of both the industry and the regulatory regime was required to 
reduce the market power of the SOEs and to create a level playing field for the entrants. 
These SOEs' market power arose from their basic vertical structure - the incumbent 
SOEs owned the natural monopoly facilities, the use of which was essential for the 
entrants to offer any upstream or downstream services, and the incumbent SOEs also 
provided services in the upstream or downstream market where competition was being 
initiated. In some countries, separation policy was adopted to break up the vertical 
structure. However, making such a policy decision involves the evaluation of the exis-
tence and the benefits of the supply side economies of scope arising from the incumbent 
operating in both competitive and non-competitive segments. Other countries sought 
to control the extent to which the incumbent can exercise its market power by various 
forms of regulation and information disclosure requirements. 
Another source of market power stemmed from the demand side. An additional user 
increases the value of the network to the existing users because there is one extra user 
to call and to receive calls from. That is to say, an additional user creates network 
externalities. The more users who join the network, the greater the value of the network 
(as presented by users' utility of being a member of a particular network). Due to the 
fact that the incumbent generally had a network with wider geographical and population 
coverage, it was favoured by the subscribers over its rivals as their network service 
provider. 
Entrants have to seek connection with the incumbent's local loop to eliminate their 
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competitive disadvantage from the demand-side economies of scope. They also have to 
connect to the incumbent's network to be able to complete calls from their customers to 
the incumbent's customers and vice versa. This interconnection requirement applies to 
both entrants who have their own facilities and to entrants without their own facilities. 
However, it is often in the incumbent's best interest to charge its rivals a high price 
for using its bottleneck facilities. This incentive to set high access or interconnection 
charges hurts the new entrants, because it raises their costs. This may make entry 
unprofitable and thus have an adverse effect on competition. A need may arise to regu-
late interconnection charges and/or prices for the final services to generate competitive 
parity among rivals when the incumbent tends to abuse its market power. 
Anther deterrent to effective competition is that the vertical structure of the incum-
bent allows it to foreclose competition in the upstream or downstream market. For 
example, if entry occurs mainly in long-distance services but the local network is pro-
tected from competition (either by a statutory monopoly or by the fact that the local 
loop is a natural monopoly), the incumbent can use its monopoly profits in the local 
services to cross subsidise its competitive services. It can therefore afford to price its 
competitive services at prices below marginal cost. This would reduce or eliminate the 
profit margin faced by potential entrants, which may make entry unprofitable even for 
carriers that are more efficient than the incumbent. 
The reason why the local loop is still a natural monopoly can be attributed to the 
existence of huge sunk costs necessary in developing a physical telephone network with 
geographical and population coverage large enough to meet the demands of all users in 
a country. Entrants who are just starting doing business, often prefer to pay the in cum-
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bent for the use of the available network rather than build a physical network, especially 
when entering an uncertain market and when interconnection fees .are reasonable. Thus, 
the entrants can save the cost of having to build their own local network. If the inter-
connection fees are too high, however, the entrants may prefer to duplicate a smaller 
local network to bypass the incumbent's local loop. This bypass investment may not 
be socially desirable because it may lead to under-utilisation of network facilities if the 
market demand is small. Duplicating network facilities with the same technology gives 
no efficiency gains and wiring the same area twice does not add more benefits to con-
sumers. Therefore, interconnection arrangements are necessary to avoid duplication of 
existing facilities. How to set the interconnection charge to ensure the optimal amount 
of capital investment in the long run is the focus of many regulatory bodies. 
Correction of market imperfections can help to avoid premature deregulation that 
gives the incumbent an upper hand when competing with its rivals. The pitfalls of 
premature deregulation may not be remediable and may make effective competition 
unattainable. Effective competition that emerges from the healthy work of market 
mechanisms will automatically act to increase efficiency and consumer surplus. How-
ever, the universal service obligation imposed on the incumbent might give rise to more 
complications. When entry occurs in the long-distance market only, the incumbent can 
recover the cost of universal service obligation from monopoly profits in the local ser-
vices, i.e. by letting local services cross-subsidise long-distance. Effective competition 
in all market segments gives the incumbent zero economic profits, and therefore the 
possibility of cross-subsidisation - using the profits from other services to finance the 
universal service obligation - is reduced or totally eliminated. The incumbent may not 
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be able to fulfil its universal service obligation unless other means of financing are pro-
posed. The deficit of universal service obligation can be financed either through the call 
termination charge or through a lump sum payment by government or shared among 
other industry participants. It is generally agreed among economists that the payment 
to the incumbent should be lump-sum in nature. Inflating the interconnection charges to 
compensate for the universal service obligation distorts the price structure and disturbs 
the supply and demand relationship. 
3.3 Governments' Role in Curing Market Imperfec-
tion 
The problems outlined above concerning the unbalanced market power justify the 
need for government intervention. However, this does not mean that government inter-
vention is the sole medicine for all problems. The well-known shortcoming of government 
intervention is its tendency to be influenced by different interest groups or political par-
<, ties even when the regulation authority has the best intentions. The responsibilities of a 
regulatory authority are numerous. It not only has to ensure free entry for competition 
purposes, but also once the conditions for free entry are established, it has to monitor 
the behaviour of both the incumbent and new entrants to prevent any anticompetitive 
practices. These anti competitive practices include the incumbent's efforts to block en-
try either by pricing strategies, unfair conditions to interconnection, collusive behaviour 
among network operators, and mergers between service providers. 
It is not difficult to understand why the incumbent would be so hostile toward en-
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trants. It has nothing to gain but everything to lose from competition, and' therefore it 
would attempt to delay or prevent a rival from bringing in competition in whatever mar-
kets it operates. The objective of a regulatory authority is to maximise both consumer 
surplus and productive efficiency gains. It is sometimes difficult to achieve both goals at 
the same time. Different regulatory regimes have been formed by various governing in-
stitutions and related regulation rules in different countries. This, together with country 
specific conditions (such as economic conditions, market structure, industry specific his-
tory and characteristics) determine the extent to which the two objectives are achieved. 
Care should be taken that regulation is not just about the system, the industry specific 
rules or the institutions. It is also about people and how people do things. Therefore 
public opinion and all related groups' understanding of the regulation playa major role 
in policy making and implemention. The regulatory regime and policy design should 
aim at encouraging cost reduction, innovation and capital investment. Minimum uncer-
tainty has to be ensured to minimise distortions in the timing of businesses' investment 
decisions. Any regulatory regime that is surrounded by too much uncertainty should be 
subject to inspection and modification. 
Government intervention always comes at a pnce, either explicit or implicit. A 
regulatory authority bears the risk of causing further market distortions with every ar-
bitration or ruling it makes. Not only that, a government has to payout of its pocket 
for gathering market information and data that are necessary for price setting or to 
monitor the behaviour of all market participants. This reduces the consumer welfare 
because the funds have to be shifted away from other uses such as education. Under 
the realistic assumption that the network operators know themselves better than other 
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operators and regulators (for instance, its cost function and the cost reduction effort), 
a regulatory authority, who is the third party, may not be able to make a well-informed 
determination on issues such as the setting of the interconnection fee or how number 
portability should be accomplished. It is questionable to what extent the information 
provided by the industry itself truly reflects the market conditions or the costs of the in-
cumbent and other market participants. Numbers can cheat, especially when the market 
participants are given an incentive to do just that. Therefore, asymmetric information 
gives market participants a chance to exploit the weakness of regulatory authorities for 
their own benefit. 
3.4 New Zealand Example 
The New Zealand government adopted a light-handed regulatory regime for which 
commercial negotiations were given the important role of replacing the numerous func-
tions of regulations. The light-handed regime originated between 1987 and 1990. It 
relies heavily on the courts and sections 27, 36 and 47 of the Commerce Act to resolve 
disputes and to prevent anticompetitive behaviour. The regime has become somewhat 
of an economic experiment since almost all other nations have chosen to be more cau-
tious over the extent of freedom given to their telecommunications industry. Although 
the use of courts to resolve interconnection problems or disputes was expected to be the 
last resort, in reality, the courts were heavily used in the New Zealand context. Volun-
tary negotiations on interconnection issues fell apart due to the lack of incentives for 
the incumbent to offer "fair and reasonable" terms and conditions to its rivals. Besides 
the arguments of appropriate pricing principles for interconnection fee setting, other 
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matters of contention such as equal access and unbundling all have subtle effects in the 
redistribution of market share and market power. In order to resolve the outstanding 
issue of number portability, Number Administration Deed was set up in New Zealand. 
This can be seen as a form of industry self-regulation. 
Although deregulating legislation did not specify equal access, the threat of generic 
antitrust litigation led Telecom (incumbent) to agree to provide equal access to Clear 
(entrant). It was initially agreed that once the market share of Clear reaches 9 %, its 
subscribers do not have to use a special access code to access Clear's telephone network 
and thus equal access would be accommodated. However, Telecom was dilatory in actual 
implementation, even though it was implemented now. 
The litigations between Telecom and Clear over pricing principles soon after dereg-
ulation were not only time consuming, but also generated a great deal of uncertainty. 
It takes years and many law suits to build up a precedent so that the industry would 
know what to expect. Owing to the fact that most decision makers of a company are 
risk averse, uncertainty delays the entry of network operators into the market. Since the 
timing of entry can have far-reaching consequences over market structure, the extent 
of competition is hence affected. On the other hand, Clear could only sue Telecom on 
the grounds of its anticompetitive practices concerning the use of Telecom's dominant 
position according to section 36 of the Commerce Act, and it had to prove this violation. 
As shown by the case history, it is difficult to prove the abuse of Telecom's market power 
or its actual anticompetitive practices by giving evidence. The fundamental innocent-
unless-otherwise-proved attitude of the courts does not provide a correct incentive to 
achieve the government's wish for immediate competition. Therefore the use of courts 
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cannot actively encourage competition in the telecommunications industry and is only 
able to confront the problem once it gets severe enough for someone to raise the case. In 
the light of this, the court dispute resolution system is considered a passive and faulty 
device. There remain questions about the ability of a court to comprehend the long run 
effects of its judgements. The lack of expertise further shows the vulnerability of a court 
for such an important task. Such weakness was even recognised by the court itself. A 
light-handed regulatory regime is unable to accomplish the government's goal, that is, 
to maximise both consumer welfare and productive efficiency gains. 
For more than a decade, the regulatory regime of New Zealand has been under vast 
criticism. It is believed that modification of the regulatory regime is needed to actively 
counter the predicament. In March 2000, the government of New Zealand mandated a 
telecommunications inquiry to gain more insights into the situation and sought public 
opinions for possible solutions. The government considered each recommendation from 
the Inquiry and made its decision on the changes to the regulatory regime. The Telecom-
munications Bill was introduced in May 2001. After the first reading, it was sent to the 
Commerce Select Committee for further scrutiny. The report came back in September 
with some amendments. The Telecommunications Act was passed in December 2001 
and a Telecommunications Commissioner was appointed in the same month. 
In Chapter 6, I will describe the process of the Inquiry and the recommendation 
it made to the government. The government's final decisions on what changes are 
necessary to be included in this second regulatory reform are discussed. More in depth 
issues concerning the resulting regimes of two reforms, such as the detail of the changes 
and the comparison of two regimes are discussed and analysed in Chapters 8. 
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Chapter 4 
Performance Comparison over 
Country Groups with Different 
Regulatory Regimes 
Technological innovation has broken the "natural monopoly" rationale for the rightful 
existence of a legal barrier to telecommunications services and equipment. Some seg-
; ments, such as the long distance telephony, have dropped out of the natural monopoly 
status and therefore competition may be desirable. This led to the widespread deregula-
tion movements in the 1980s and 1990s of the OEeD countries. In order to counter the 
problem of market imperfections that are typical in the telecommunications industry, 
the leading deregulating countries developed various new regulation techniques. It is 
worth noting that the regulation practices adopted during the regulatory reform were 
quite different from those under the state-owned monopoly era. The new regulatory 
practices focused on preserving economic incentives giving businesses higher motivation 
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to act in a profit-maximising and/or cost-minimising manner. 
Each country has its own specific economic and market conditions, and therefore the 
scale and the scope of deregulation varies across OECD countries. Other factors, such 
as the timing of deregulation, the speed of the deregulation process, the length of lags 
for the deregulation to impact on market structure, etc. have contributed to placing 
different OECD countries in different positions along the regulatory reform process. 
In this chapter, I intend to examine what regulatory regime (in terms of the extent 
of liberalisation) would deliver a better performance measure - such as low price, high 
productivity and high quality - in the telecommunications industry. To this end, I follow 
the approach by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) to group twenty-four OECD countries with 
regard to their similarity in regulatory environment and market structure. Scatterplots 
are used to present the price-productivity and price-quality performance relationships to 
assist in identifying "groups of countries" that generally give better performance related 
to the OECD average. I discuss the institutional settings and market structure of these 
different groups in detail in Chapter 5. 
This chapter is of threefold: The first part is devoted to the construction of the 
regulation and market structure indicators. These indicators are used to run factor 
and cluster analysis. The cluster analysis groups countries according to their similar-
ity in regulation and market structure. The second part of this chapter discusses the 
econometric model used by Boylaud and Nicoletti to infer the effects of deregulation on 
telecommunications performance by finding the variables that best explain the variation 
of regulatory regime and market outcomes over both time and countries. Based on this 
result, the performance measures that have contributed to regulation and market struc-
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ture can be singled out. The third part combines the information from part one and 
part two to show how performance and regulatory regimes are interrelated. I intend 
to use the scatterplots to represent such links. A detailed examination of regulatory 
regimes that follows the interpretation of the scatterplots will be given in Chapter 5. 
4.1 Regulation and Market Structure Indicators 
Boylaud and Nicoletti use an original international database on regulation, market 
structure and performance in the telecommunications industry to investigate the effects 
of entry liberalisation and privatisation on productivity, price and quality of services in 
domestic long distance (trunk), international long distance (international) and mobile 
cellular (mobile) telephony services. In addition, the effect of changes in the regulatory 
and market structure of trunk services on the prices of leased lines services (leasing) is 
also analysed. Some services (such as local fixed voice telephony) are not included in 
the study due to the fact that they are still monopolistic in a vast majority of OECD 
countries. The inclusion of these services, therefore, cannot provide insights into how 
competition, which was created with the initiation of market liberalisation, affects the 
performance. 
The following four indicators of the market and regulatory environment were con-
structed over the period 1991-1997 for each of the telecommunications services consid-
ered in the analysis other than mobile services (1993-1997). The liberalisation index 
ranks the legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in each market. The 
index o£state ownership is based on the share of the public telecommunications op-
erator's (PTO's) capital owned by the state and the presence of special voting rights. 
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The index of internationalisation of domestic markets is based on the number of non-
resident operators participating in alliances, joint ventures or cooperation agreements 
with domestic operators aimed at providing services in the domestic telecommunications 
markets in 1995. Lastly, the index of actual market structure is based on the market 
share (in total traffic) of new entrants in trunk and international services and by the 
number of competitors in mobile services. 
In addition, two indicators are used to proxy for anticipations of future changes in 
regulatory policies. The prospect of liberalisation index measures the number of years 
remaining before liberalisation of each market. The prospect of privatisation index 
measures the number of years remaining before the first sale of PTO shares by the 
government. 
These indicators are used to describe the cross-country patterns of regulation and 
market structure. Applying the factor analysis to the indicators over the 1993-1997 
period (due to unavailability of data on mobile service previous to 1993), four main fac-
tors that determined the position of each OECD country along the reform process are 
identified (Table 4.1). The first factor (associated with liberalisation and market struc-
ture in trunk and international, state ownership and internationalisation) expresses the 
market and regulatory environment in fixed telephony; the second factor (associated 
with prospects of liberalisation of all services) expresses the timing of the liberalisation 
process; the third factor (associated with liberalisation market structure in mobile ser-
vices) expresses the market and regulatory environment in mobile services and the last 
factor (associated with prospects of privatisation) expresses the timing of the privati-
sation process. Countries can be scored along each of the four factors (a higher score 
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Table 4.1: Regulation and Market Structure: the Discriminating Factors, 1993-1997 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
Liberalisation Index: 
International 
Trunk 
Market Structure: 
International 
Trunk 
State Ownership of PTO 
Liberalisation Perspectives: 
International 
Trunk 
Mobile 
Interntionalisation of Domestic Market 
Liberalisation Index: 
Mobile 
Market Structure: 
Mobile 
Privitisation Pel·~nf,ctives 
Notes: 
Market and Regulatory 
Environment in fixed 
Telephony 
0.55 
0.55 
-0.05 
0.62 
0.12 
0.22 
0.26 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
Rotation Coverged in 10 iterations 
Source: Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) 
Timing of the 
Liberalisation 
Process 
0.26 
0.26 
0.15 
0.44 
0.20 
0.03 
Market and Regulatory 
Environment in Mobile 
Telephony 
0.14 
0.17 
0.25 
0.06 
-0.31 
0.04 
0.04 
Privatisation 
Perspectives 
0.19 
0.19 
0.07 
0.14 
-0.14 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.12 
-0.05 
0.49 
implying a more liberalised regulatory and market environment) and the average scores 
over the 1993-1997 period constitute the basis for positioning countries along the regu-
latory reform process. 
Given the position of each country (represented by a different score with respect to 
the discriminating factors), the distance (the dissimilarity in regulatory environment and 
market structure) between countries can be calculated. Dendrogram is used to represent 
such distance (dissimilarity) between countries. Following the Dendrogram (Figure 4.1), 
twenty-four OECD countries are separated into four major groups and three outliers. 
Countries in the same group are considered similar in regulation and market environ-
ment as measured by the regulation and market structure indicators. Group one (G 1) 
consists often countries including Italy (Ita), Spain (Spa), Belgium (Bel), Ireland (Ire), 
France (Fra) , Germany (Ger), Portugal (Por) , Denmark (Den), Netherlands (Net) and 
Norway (Nor). Group two (G2) consists of Canada (Can), Japan (Jap), the United 
Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Australia (Aust) and Sweden (Swe). Group 
three (G3) countries include Austria (Au), Switzerland (Swi) and Iceland (Ice). Group 
four (G4) consist of Finland (Fin) and New Zealand (NZ). Three countries Greece (Gre), 
Luxembourg (Lux) and Thrkey (Thr) bear the least similarity in regulatory environment 
and market structure with other OECD country groups and therefore are not included 
in any country groups, and are called outliers. The ranking of country groups in lib-
eralisation can be established as follows. The most liberalised countries are in G2. G4 
countries ranked second in liberalisation. G 1 is the third most liberalised country group. 
The least liberalised country group is G3. 
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Figure 4.1: Grouping Countries According to Regulation and Market Structure 
(Dendrogram) 
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4.2 Econometric Model 
Boylaud and Nicoletti exploit the variation of regulatory regimes and market out-
comes over both time and countries to infer the effects of deregulation on performance. 
The model is built as follows. The dependent variable (Yist, performance measures, in-
cluding productivity, price and quality) is a function of the four explanatory variables: 
country specific effects, fi; a set of exogenous economic characteristics that are assumed 
to influence performance independent of regulation and market structure, Zs[i, t]; a set 
of market structure indicators, Ms[i, tJ and; a set of regulation indicators, Rs[i, tJ. This 
can be shown as: 
(4.1) 
The model is estimated for single service (eg. trunk) or for all serVIces pooled 
using panel data technique, considering countries as the relevant individuals. Table 4.2 
describes the economic structure (income, costs and price rebalancing indicator) and 
technology indicators (percentage of digital and capital intensity) used in this empirical 
analysis. Price rebalancing indicator for economic structure is constructed to proxy the 
extent to which the price deviated from underlying costs. The indicators of regulation 
and market structure are constructed to increase the precision and reliability of the 
coefficient estimates. 
Table 4.3 shows how the performance measures are constructed. Due to data con-
straints, Boylaud and Nicoletti use a narrow definition of output, including the number 
of subscribers (for the trunk and mobile services) and the number of minutes of outgoing 
telecommunications (for the international service). The input measurement is focused 
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Table 4.2: Indicators of Technology and Econ~l11~ Structure f~r EI1!piricalAnalysisl 
Model Definition Period Obs 
Technology: Percentage of Digital 
International 
Trunk 
% Digital Lines in Total Mainlines 
% Digital Lines in Total Mainlines 
Mobile % of Digital Subscribers 
Technology: Capital Intensity 
All Services 
All Services 
Total Fixed Investment in Telecomffotal Employment 
Total Fixed Investment in TelecomlNumber of Mainlines 
All Services Telecom Capital Stock( cumulated sum of investment 
over 10 years) !Number of Mainlines 
Economic Structure: Income 
All Services Total Telecom. Revenue/Population 
All Services GDPlPopulation 
Economic Structure: Costs 
All Services Total Operating Expenditurerrotal Employment 
All Services Total Operating Expenditure!Number of Mainlines 
Economic Structure: Price Rebalancing Indicator 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
93-97· 120.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
91-97 168.0 
All Services Distance of Price Structure in Country i at time t 91-97 154.0 
from the Price Structure of the Uk in 19982 
l. Values are in US$ based on 1993 PPPs 
2. The distance was computed us (100-1I4(SUM(ABS(PDISTXuk98» where X=local, 27krn, 110krn,490krn 
and PDrSTX = price for the distance X 
Source: OEeD Telecommunications Database 
Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.3 
0.3 
0.8 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
1.5 
1.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
Minimum Maximum 
0.0 1.0 
0.0 1.0 
0.0 1.0 
1.0 15.0 
57.0 505.0 
145.0 3061.0 
0.6 66.0 
0.5 33.0 
85.8 297l.0 
0.7 12.0 
43.3 98.0 
Mean 
0.7 
0.7 
0.3 
4.1 
221.0 
1777.0 
5.2 
2.4 
1055.0 
5.9 
67.0 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
2.2 
91.0 
641.0 
7.6 
4.1 
455.0 
2.3 
13.0 
Table 4.3: Performance Indicators for Eml!irical Anal~sisl 
Model Definition Period Obs Coefficient of Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Detennination Deviation 
Productivity 
International Outgoing Minutes of International Communications (MITI) 91-97 168 1.5 2177 346637 35170 52937 
rrotal Employment 
Trunk Number of Mainlinesrrotal Employment 91-97 168 0.3 77.4 337.8 183 48.2 
Mobile Number of Mobile Subscribers/Mobile Employment 93-97 110 2.7 80 32196 1288 3458 
Prices 
International Collection Charges ( average of peak I minute 91-97 168 0.4 0.5 2.9 1.1 0.4 
to OECD countries) 
International Revenue From International Service/Outgoing MITI 91-97 168 0.6 0.1 2.8 0.9 0.5 
Trunk Tariff Basket (Excluding Tax) 91-97 161 0.4 375 2530 1138 418 
Mobile Revenue From Mobile ServicelNumber of Mobile Subscribers 93-97 115 0.6 173 2894 775 451 
Leasing OECD Basket of National Leased Line Charges:64 kbitls (excluding tax) 91-97 161 1.5 19745 1632547 103880 159784 
Quality 
International Answer Seizure Rati02 91-97 168 0.1 36.9 70.7 60 7.2 
Trunk Service Reliability (average of call success rate and fault 91-97 167 0.7 0.8 47.5 16.1 10.7 
clearance rate) 
1. Values are in US$ based on 1993 PPPs 
2. The answer seizure ratio is the proportion of international calls that successfully seize an international circuit and are answered in the terminating country 
3. The call success rate is defined as one minus the number of faults per mainline. The fault clearance rate is the number of faults repaired in 24 hours 
Source: OECD Telecommunications Database 
on labour input only. Such partial productivity measures may be misleading, as pointed 
out by Boylaud and Nicoletti, because they are unable to account for cross country 
productivity differences induced by the use of different factor proportions. To construct 
price data, Boylaud and Nicoletti apply OEeD tariff baskets and supplement them with 
two measures of "average prices" in the international and mobile services: international 
revenue per minute of outgoing conversation and mobile revenues per subscriber. The 
differences from OEeD average are presented in percentage points (eg. -0.4 means below 
OEeD average by forty percent). The quality is proxied by a combination of number of 
faults per mainline (so-called "call failure rate") and number of faults repaired within 
twenty-four hours (so-called "fault clearance rate") in trunk telecommunications. In 
international services, the quality is proxied by the percentage of calls completed (so-
called "answer seizure ratio"). 
Each equation (based on model 4.1) is estimated using a random effects specification 
and a fixed effects specification model. The slope coefficients are assumed to be identical 
across countries. Tests for model specification and the correction for heteroskedasticity 
are conducted although in most cases controlling for potential heteroskedasticity did not 
significantly change the result. The regulatory and market structure are good indicators 
because they significantly improve the fit of the regressions. The degree of market 
competition and the time to libetalisation are the two main explanations for the cross 
country and time variability in productivity and prices. 
The results of the regression analysis can be used to calculate the relative contri-
bution of, on one hand, country-specific and structure effects (economic structure and 
technology) and, on the other hand, regulatory and market structure effects to explain-
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The intention here is to separate 
the c
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"regulatory a
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n
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v
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n
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n
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o
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c
c
o
u
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n
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a
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n
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hole, so
 the discussion is based o
n
 the 
re
sults of the pooled regression. U
sing the re
sults of the pooled regression, the perfor-
m
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n
c
e
 deviations that c
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n
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nd m
a
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 su
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m
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up to three categories: 
m
a
rket structure (proxy by the m
a
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e to liberalisation) a
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w
n
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nd privatisation (proxy 
by state o
w
n
ership index a
nd tim
e to privatisation). 
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Tables 4.4, 4.5, 
a
nd 4.6 give the relative c
o
ntributions of the u
n
e
xplained c
o
u
ntry-
specific effects (in n
ature), the structure effects (including eco
n
o
m
ic structure a
nd tech-
n
ology) a
nd the effects of regulation a
nd m
a
rket structure o
n
 the deviation of a
n
 indi-
vidual c
o
u
ntry's perform
ance from
 the O
EeD
 av
erages. In Tables 4.4, 4.5, a
nd 4.6 the 
a
ctual perform
ance (productivity, price a
nd quality respectively) deviation from
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EeD
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erages a
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olum
n o
n
e. The deviation arises from
 three so
u
rces as specified in the 
m
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c
o
u
ntry specific effect, eco
n
o
m
ic structure a
nd regulation a
nd m
a
rket structure. 
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Table 4.4: Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Telecommunications Performance (Pooled Estimates) 
Productivityl 
Productivity Country Economic Regulation and Market Structure Liberalisation Ownership and 
Specific Structure2 Market Structure (a) (b) Privatisation (c) 
Effect (a+h+c) 
Australia -0.70 -1.00 -0.09 0.39 0.06 0.44 -0.10 
Austria 0.19 0.25 0.12 -0.18 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 
Belgium -0.05 0.46 -0.03 -0.47 -0.09 -0.12 -0.27 
Canada -0.35 -0.40 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.42 -0.54 
Denmark -0.02 0.37 -0.12 -0.27 0.00 0.15 -0.42 
Finland -0.17 -1.33 0.05 1.11 0.14 0.38 0.59 
France -0.08 0.00 0.13 -0.21 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 
Germany -0.20 -0.04 0.14 -0.30 -0.01 -0.10 -0.19 
Greece -0.10 0.44 -0.20 -0.33 -0.01 -0.90 0.58 
Iceland -0.29 -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 -0.14 -0.10 0.20 
Ireland -0.73 -0.30 -0.06 -0.37 -0.06 -0.12 -0.19 
Italy 0.39 0.56 0.11 -0.28 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14 
Japan 0.23 -1.05 0.11 1.17 0.16 0.44 0.57 
Luxembourg 2.46 1.82 0.29 0.35 -0.14 -0.10 0.59 
Netherlands 0.50 0.80 0.04 -0.34 -0.03 0.03 -0.33 
New Zealand -0.36 -0.39 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.44 -0.52 
Norway -0.53 -0.99 -0.03 0.48 -0.01 -0.10 0.59 
Portugal -0.44 0.23 -0.02 -0.65 -0.01 -0.37 -0.28 
Spain -0.06 0.23 0.04 -0.33 -0.06 -0.10 -0.17 
Sweden -0.14 -1.08 -0.04 0.98 0.03 0.35 0.59 
Switzerland 0.75 0.94 0.06 -0.24 -0.14 -0.10 0.00 
Turkey 0.47 1.35 -0.26 -0.62 -0.11 -1.10 0.59 
United Kingdom -0.31 -0.25 -0.09 0.03 0.11 0.44 -0.52 
United States -0.28 -0.32 -0.08 0.12 0.22 0.44 -0.54 
1. Deviations from the OECD average 
2. Including the effect of technology 
Table 4.5: Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Telecommunications Performance (Pooled Estimates) 
Prices! 
Productivity . Country Economic Regulation and Market Structure Liberalisation Ownership and 
Specific Structure2 Market Structure (a) (b) Privatisation (c) 
Effect (a+h+c) 
Australia 0.16 0.70 -0.08 -0.46 -0.05 -0.41 0.00 
Austria 0.41 0.33 -0.06 0.14 0.05 0.11 -0.02 
Belgium 0.21 0.15 -0.16 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.03 
Canada -0.13 0.23 -0.04 -0.32 -0.10 -0.39 0.17 
Denmark -0.86 -0.65 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 -0.14 0.08 
Finland -0.80 0.07 -0.26 -0.60 -0.12 -0.36 -0.13 
France -0.09 -0.02 -0.17 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.00 
Germany -0.10 -0.04 -0.18 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.02 
Greece -0.07 -0.40 -0.41 0.74 0.01 0.84 -0.12 
Iceland -0.64 -0.77 -0.04 0.16 0.12 0.09 -0.06 
Ireland 0.14 0.12 -0.16 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.02 
Italy 0.17 0.12 -0.11 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.03 
Japan 1.01 1.70 -0.03 -0.66 -0.14 -0.41 -0.11 
Luxembourg 3.37 0.00 3.28 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.13 
Netherlands -0.36 -0.24 -0.17 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.05 
New Zealand -0.46 0.00 -0.12 -0.34 -0.08 -0.41 0.15 
Norway -0.80 -0.70 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.13 
Portugal 0.75 0.65 -0.30 0.39 0.01 0.34 0.04 
Spain 0.53 0.51 -0.18 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Sweden -0.79 -0.13 -0.17 -0.49 -0.03 -0.33 -0.13 
Switzerland -0.19 -0.42 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.09 -0.02 
Turkey 1.63 1.14 -0.52 1.00 0.10 1.03 -0.13 
United Kingdom -0.40 0.09 -0.14 -0.35 -0.09 -0.41 0.15 
United States 0.18 0.49 0.13 -0.44 -0.20 -0.41 0.17 
1. Deviations from OECD average 
2. Including the effect of technology and price rebalancing 
Table 4.6: Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Telecommunications Performance ( Pooled Estimates) 
Quality! 
Productivity Country Economic Regulation and Market Structure Liberalisation Ownership, 
Specific Structure2 Market Structure (a) (b) Privatisation and 
Effect (a+h+c) Intemationalisation (c) 
Australia -3.90 -8.08 0.83 3.35 0.17 2.85 0.34 
Austria 0.90 1.47 1.09 -1.66 -0.17 -0.77 -0.72 
Belgium 3.16 4.38 -0.38 -0.84 -0.25 -0.77 0.17 
Canada 6.91 2.64 0.10 4.17 0.31 2.73 1.13 
Denmark 4.83 5.07 -0.78 0.54 0.00 0.98 -0.44 
Finland -0.23 -1.78 -0.35 1.90 0.39 2.48 -0.97 
France 5.82 6.63 -0.23 -0.58 -0.03 -0.64 0.08 
Germany 0.52 0.01 0.80 -0.29 -0.03 -0.64 0.38 
Greece -20.17 -12.46 -1.12 -6.59 -0.03 -5.88 -0.69 
Iceland -8.59 -5.57 -1.18 -1.84 -0.39 -0.64 -0.80 
Ireland -0.02 0.83 0.46 -1.31 -0.17 -0.77 -0.37 
Italy 1.71 1.57 0.74 -0.60 -0.10 -0.68 0.19 
Japan 11.65 6.34 0.64 4.67 0.46 2.85 1.36 
Luxembourg 4.55 6.04 0.51 -2.00 -0.39 -0.64 -0.97 
Netherlands 8.17 9.09 -0.48 -0.44 -0.10 0.19 -0.53 
New Zealand -8.25 -12.38 0.47 3.66 0.25 2.85 0.55 
Norway -0.48 1.36 -0.20 -1.64 -0.03 -0.64 -0.97 
Portugal -8.70 -6.84 0.60 -2.46 -0.03 -2.39 -0.05 
Spain 1.48 1.63 0.68 -0.84 -0.17 -0.68 0.02 
Sweden 4.61 2.86 -0.69 2.44 0.09 2.31 0.04 
Switzerland 1.30 2.05 1.00 -1.76 -0.39 -0.64 -0.72 
Turkey -17.86 -8.47 -1.94 -7.45 -0.32 -7.17 0.04 
United Kingdom 2.51 -1.67 -0.53 4.71 0.30 2.85 1.56 
United States 10.43 5.62 -0.04 4.86 0.63 2.85 1.38 
1. Deviations from the OECD average 
2. Including the effect of technology 
These figures can be explained using New Zealand as an example. In New Zealand, the 
actual price of telecommunications services is below OECD average by 46% (represented 
by -0.46 in column one). This deviation can be primarily attributed to New Zealand's 
regulation environment and market structure, which accounts for 34% (represented by 
-0.34 in column four) of the deviation. Economic structure and country-specific effect 
will together account for the rest 12% deviation (column 2 + 3). 
In Section 4.1, twenty-four OECD countries are separated into four groups according 
to their similarity in regulation and market structure based on cluster analysis. G2 is 
the most liberalised country group whereas G4 ranked second. G 1 ranked third in 
the extent of liberalisation, and G3 ranked fourth. I intend to use this information 
on scatterplots to examine regulatory regimes (as represented by country groups) that 
deliver better performance. Four scatterplots are drawn based on column one (actual 
performance) and column four (performance as a result of regulation environment and 
market structure) for price-productivity and price-quality. 
Figures 4.2 (price-productivity) and 4.3 (price-quality) are drawn using actual per-
formance data. The countries of best performance in telecommunications services should 
lie on the quadrant that presents high productivity (or quality) and low price, while the 
countries of worst performance would lie on the quadrant that presents low productivity 
(or quality) and high price. In price-productivity (Figure 4.2), the group performance 
is not clear. G 1 countries spread on all four quadrants. Belgium, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland lie on the worst quadrant while the Netherlands is on the best. Among G2 
co~ntries, the United States and Australia are on the worst quadrant and none on the 
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best. The only G3 country, Switzerland, is on the best quadrant and none on the worst. 
G4 countries, Finland and New Zealand both have low price and low productivity. In 
price-quality (Figure 4.3), the group performance is again vague. G 1 countries generally 
de~iver good quality services, except Portugal. The Netherlands and Denmark are on 
the best quadrant and Portugal is on the worst. G2 countries generally give good 
performance in price and quality. Canada, UK and Sweden show good quality and 
low price. The only exception is Australia which has high price and low quality. G3 
countries again spread on three different quadrants, Switzerland is on the best quadrant 
and none on the worst. In G4, Finland has low price and average productivity while 
New Zealand has low price and low productivity. 
Figures 4.4 (price-productivity) and 4.5 (price-quality) are drawn based on the re-
gression analysis in section 4.2. The effect of regulation and market structure on perfor-
mance is singled out for its direct influence on performance. In Figure 4.4, it is clear to 
see that G2 countries generally outperform other country groups. All G2 countries are 
on the low-price high-productivity quadrant. G4 countries follow close by. Most Gl and 
G3 countries do not perform well, with the exception of Norway. Gl and G3 countries 
generally show higher price and lower productivity than OECD average, though the 
difference is not very significant. On average, G3 countries perform a bit better than 
G 1. In Figure 4.5, the four country groups are either on the high-price low-quality or 
low-price high-quality quadrant. Both G2 and G4 countries are on the best quadrant. 
On average, G2 countries perform a little better than G4 countries. Gl and G3 countries 
are on the worst quadrant, with the exception of Norway and Denmark. Gl countries 
on average have better performance than G3 countries. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
There is a significant difference between figures based on actual performance data 
and figures based on data resulting from the regression model. The actual performance 
of telecommunications services is subject to the state of influence factors such as reg-
ulation, market conditions, economic conditions, political environment, and level of 
technology of each individual country. However, the aim in this section is to find the 
relationships between regulation and performance of telecommunications services. For 
this purpose, the effect of "noise" factors - factors other than regulation that can influ-
ence performance - should be purged off the performance measure. Therefore, Figure 
4.4 and 4.5 are more appropriate in representing the relationship between regulation 
and performance. 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 do not give clear pictures of the link between regulation and 
performance. The group performance and therefore comparison are hard to establish. 
However, in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the relationships can be easily identified. In general, the 
more a country is liberalised, the better its telecommunications industry performs. This 
result provides a grand direction for the regulatory reforms especially to those countries 
that still maintain a statutory monopoly. Liberalising the telecommunications industry 
and therefore allowing the competition to emerge and to become effective improves 
telecommunications performance. 
In the next chapter, I want to provide more information on the regulatory regimes of 
OEeD countries. It is hoped that more insights on the link between regulatory regime 
and performance can be obtained from sources other than numerical analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
Regulation in OECD Countries 
In Section 4.1, twenty-four OECD countries were separated into four groups and three 
outliers according to their similarity in regulation and market structure. Indices were 
constructed for the factor and cluster analysis and other econometric tests. Although 
indices can be useful tools in analysis, they have their limitation in providing information 
on regulatory matters. Therefore, in this chapter, the regulatory settings of all OECD 
countries are explored to complement studies outlined in the last chapter and to give us 
a better view of what these indices are representing. 
The main sources of regulatory setting used in this chapter are from Boylaud and 
Nicoletti (2000), OECD Secretariat and OECD Communications Outlook (1999). These 
source documents used information from the OECD (1998) survey of the regulation and 
market structure. Therefore, the discussions and descriptions are mainly based on 1998 
and 1999 data with some current updates. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
regulatory practices, institutions and market structure of OECD member countries. The 
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following five sections are discussions and descriptions of each individual country's and 
the group of country's regulatory regimes and market structure. The precise details are 
in Tables 5.1-5.4. The last section is a short conclusion. Using the groups from Section 
4.1, we can verify the raking of liberalisation as stated by Boylaud and Nicoletti (from 
the most to the least: G2, G4, G1, G3) and other information from the analysis. 
5.1 Regulation and Market Structure of OECD Mem-
her Countries: An Overview 
This section consist of two parts: regulation and market structure. The regulation 
part covers not only the long distance and mobile services, but also regulatory issues 
concerning local telephony. Local telephony is included due to its growing importance 
in competition. The market structure part discusses the market share of the dominant 
operators and its largest competitors and relates this to the regulatory structure in each 
country. All OECD countries are covered in this section. 
5.1.1 Regulation 
In the majority of countries, basic regulatory competencies (eg. licensing, regu-
lations on interconnection and pricing, and regulation on service quality) are shared 
among three institutions: a ministry department, the sectoral regulator and the compe-
tition authority. OECD (1998) summarises the application of each regulatory institution 
among twenty-nine OECD countries in 1999. The study finds that competition author-
ity, such as the Commerce Commission, is involved in carrying out regulation in 76% 
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of the countries. Ministry department also plays an important role in regulating the 
telecommunications industry (66%). Most countries have a sectoral regulator (86%) 
which is often independent of other government institutions. An independent regulator 
is adopted to govern the telecommunications sector, to shield the market from political 
interference, and to improve transparency, stability and expertise. An independent reg-
ulator is considered as an institution of modern regulatory governance, as opposed to the 
old system where the functioning of the regulation responsibilities was not structurally 
separated from the Ministry or other government departments. Although this form of 
governance is highly regarded, it is not immune from some problems that plague the old 
system, such as the risk of over-regulation. It creates a few new problems of its own. 
For example, coordination with other government departments becomes harder. 
All member countries have given regulatory power for interconnection to the same 
institution that is responsible for retail price regulation. The United States is the only 
country where the regulatory supervision on interconnection is shared by a federal agency 
and state public utility commissions. 
< All OECD countries have significantly relaxed the legal barriers to entry. Only six 
countries still maintained legal monopoly in long distance services (trunk and inter-
national) in 1998. All countries' mobile markets are open to competition. However, 
many governments continue to more or less exercise control over major public telecom-
munications operators (PTOs). The control is exercised through the holding of shares, 
having special voting rights, etc. Foreign investment is restricted and supervised in 
many OECD countries. 
Regulation on retail price and/or interconnection charges is common practice among 
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OECD countries. Retail price regulation is often incentive-based, usually through some 
kind of price cap mechanisms, while the interconnection charges are mainly cost-based. 
These price regulations apply to the incumbent PTOs or dominant operators instead 
of all operators in most cases. Therefore, interconnection agreements between two car-
riers without significant power are seen as a commercial matter while interconnection 
charges of operators with significant market power are subject to the authorisation of 
the regulator. 
Privatisation of PTOs is not as obvious as liberalisation. In 1992, only four countries 
had fully privatised incumbent PTOs. In 1998, two more were added to the list of being 
fully privatised. The governments of the OECD member countries preserved significant 
shares of their dominant PTOs. In 1998, the average state shareholdings of PTO is 
51.2%. Compared with 1992 statistics, which was greater than 77%, we can see that 
privatisation is still in progress. 
5.1.2 Market Structure 
Most incumbent PTOs still hold the majority of market shares in voice telephony 
(trunk and international). Therefore, the market share of the second largest operators 
rarely exceeds 20% for trunk and international services. In mobile (digital) services, 
however, the second largest operator has obtained significant market share, many over 
30%. This may be attributed to the fact that mobile services are relatively new compared 
to basic voice telephony. Most countries have already undergone significant liberalisation 
of markets, and entrants can therefore start competing with the incumbent in the mobile 
market before the incumbent has a chance to obtain full market penetration. 
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In spite of the early introduction of competition in the 1980s, the market share of new 
entrants in the local market is not significant in Japan « 7%) and the United States 
« 5%). In the United Kingdom new entrants have an 18% market share in the local 
market, which makes the United Kingdom the only country where local competition has 
really taken off. In other member countries, the incumbent has more than 97% of the 
market share in local market, except Australia, Belgium, Denmark, and Austria where 
new entrants have approximately 3%-5% market share. 
5.2 Group One Countries 
There are ten countries that belong to group one: Italy, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway. These European coun-
tries are all members of the European Union. The deregulation of these countries is 
characterised by a hierarchy of structure. The European Commission has defined the 
general principles for which each country's national regulatory agencies can implement 
with some degree of freedom. Full deregulation in telecommunications services has been 
in place since January I, 1998. Therefore, it is no surprise that these countries have 
similar regulation and market structure. 
There were no legal restrictions on entry into trunk and international services for 
G 1 countries except for Portugal, which has licensed only one operator for providing 
trunk and international services. The entry condition in mobile services (digital) has 
been limited by spectrum in most G1 countries, which means that entry is only con-
ditional on the availability of frequencies. Entry conditions on mobile are relatively 
loose compared to the licence requirements in trunk and international services in some 
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countries. However, in Italy and Spain, the market is restricted to a duopoly structure. 
France, Germany and Portugal have had particularly liberal mobile environments, but 
restrictive fixed telephony environments. Most countries in G 1 liberalised the trunk and 
international services prior to 1998 with the exception of Portugal. The mobile services 
of all G1 countries were liberalised during the 1989 - 1996 period. The state control of 
PTO is widespread. The number of foreign telecommunications operators participating 
in joint ventures or other co-operation agreement with the domestic market is usually 
between one to four. 
G 1 countries are rated as the third most liberalised country group. Entry in general 
is not restricted. Mobile services were liberalised in the early 1990s, new entrants have 
obtained thirty to fifty percent of the market (digital). The liberalisation of the trunk 
and international services occurred in the late 1990s. New entrants have only obtained 
insignificant market share in both trunk and international services. This shows that 
liberalisation policy takes time to transform the market structure and to enhance com-
petition. It may also suggest that other means of regulation can be employed, such as 
cost-oriented LRIC interconnection principle, to intensify competition. 
5.3 Group Two Countries 
There are six countries that belong to Group Two. They are Canada, Japan, United 
Kingdom, United States, Australia and Sweden. These countries lead the way of dereg-
ulation. 
There are no legal restrictions to entry for either trunk or international services in 
all G2 countries. The mobile services were limited by spectrum only. The G2 countries 
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liberalised all three services quite early. Japan, UK and US started the liberalisation 
process in the 1980s. Australia, Canada and Sweden followed closely and liberalised 
the provision of telecommunications services in the early 1990s. The number of foreign 
telecommunications operators involved in the domestic market in G2 countries was the 
highest among all country groups. This can be attributed to the fact that they liberalised 
at an early stage and therefore the competition was initiated earlier or the fact that 
restrictions on foreign investors are not so strict as the other country groups. Still, state 
control was apparent in G2 countries. 
G2 countries largely were first-movers in regulatory reform in telecommunications, as 
they allliberalised telecommunications services well before mid 1990s. The vast reform 
movements have stimulated competition in the industry, which has had direct impacts 
on the market structure. The minimal legal restrictions on entry have induced many 
entries into the market. Price regulation applies mostly to the incumbent PTOs to 
curtail the competitive advantage that the incumbent inherited from its having been 
the statutory monopoly in the past. 
5.4 Group Three Countries 
There are only three countries in Group Three: Austria, Switzerland and Iceland. 
No legal restrictions on entry were imposed on any G3 country in trunk and inter-
national services. The mobile services are limited by spectrum. All telecommunications 
services of G3 countries were liberalised in the late 1990s. Austria is the only country 
that has no restrictions concerning PTO (for instance, the special voting rights of the 
government) . 
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G3 countries ranked the last in the degree of liberalisation. The liberalisation of all 
telecommunications services took place in the late 1990s. There was no evidence to show 
that the liberalisation policy has made an impact on market structure yet, although the 
entry to the market is relatively free now. 
5.5 G roup Four Countries 
Only two countries belong to Group Four: New Zealand and Finland. 
The two G4 countries have not set legal restrictions on entry for trunk and inter-
national services. In Finland, the mobile services are limited by spectrum. In New 
Zealand, only two operators provided mobile services. To operate mobile networks in 
New Zealand, operators are required to obtain management rights, which are sold by 
public auction and are tradable in the market. The liberalisation of all three services 
occurred during the early 1990s and state control is still practised in both countries. 
In New Zealand, such control is managed through the so called "Kiwi Share". The 
maintenance of such special shares is to secure the social goals of the government. 
The G4 countries represent the second most liberalised country group. These two 
countries are among the first-mover countries in liberalisation. However, due to a low 
degree of internationalisation and a low number of competitors in the mobile market, 
they are not as liberal as G2 countries. The entry restrictions are loose and new entrants 
have gained sizeable market share in trunk, international and mobile services. The 
analogue technology in mobile services, however, continues to be operated purely by the 
dominant incumbent in both countries. 
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5.6 Outliers 
The outlier countries categorised here are Greece, Luxembourg and Thrkey. Al-
though these three countries are deemed dissimilar in regulation and market structure 
by cluster analysis, for simplicity, discussions of the regulation and market condition of 
these three countries are placed under the same heading. 
In Greece and Thrkey, the telecommunications market of trunk and international 
services was dominated by its statutory monopoly. Luxembourg liberalised in 1998 and 
therefore its trunk and international services are now open to competition by new en-
trants. Greece planned to start the liberalisation process in the year 2001 and Thrkey 
may liberalise its telecommunications industry in the near future. Greece has particu-
larly liberal environments in mobile telephony, but restrictive fixed telephony environ-
ment. In Luxembourg the degree of internationalisation and the number of competitors 
in the mobile market were low. State control of the PTO exists in all three outlier coun-
tries. The state shareholdings of the dominant PTO in 1998 was 100% in Luxembourg 
and Thrkey and 65% in Greece. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
The country groups with more liberal regulatory environment and market structure 
in general give better performance in terms of low-price high-productivity and low-
price high-quality combinations. This relationship resulting from numerical analysis is 
verified with the examination of the actual regulatory environment and market structure 
in the OEeD member countries. The regulatory experiences and conditions of the 
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OECD member countries provide a nice case study for the regulation and competition 
issues. Competition bridges the link between regulation and telecommunications services 
performance. Regulation that induces and facilitates competition without creating too 
much market distortion appears to work the best to achieve efficiency gains in the 
telecommunications industry. 
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Ta bI 51 R e . : I f egu a .on 0 fE t n ryan dF orelgn I nvestment, 1998 
Legal Restrictions of Entry Year of liberalization Foreign investment 
Trunk International Mobile Trunk International Mobile no. of competitors Restriction concerning PTO 
GROUPl 
limited by 
Belgium open open spectrum 98 98 96 3 State control 
limited by 
Denmark open open spectrum 96 96 < 92 No 
limited by 
France open open spectrum 98 98 89 3 State control 
limited by 
Germany open open spectrum 98 98 91 4 State control 
limited by 
Ireland open open spectrum 98 98 1 State control 
Italy open open duopoly 98 98 94 3 Yes 
limited by 
Netherlands open open spectrum 97 97 95 Yes 
limited by 
Norway open open spectrum 98 98 92 Yes 
license license limited by 
Portugal one fum one fum spectrum 2000 2000 91 2 No 
Spain open open duopoly 98 98 94 2 Yes 
GROUP2 
limited by 
Australia open open spectrum 91 91 92 4 Yes 
limited by 
Canada open open spectrum 90 92 5 
limited by 
Japan open open spectrum 86 87 87 9 State control 
limited by 
Sweden open open spectrum 94 92 86 4 State control 
limited by 
UK open open spectrum 85 86 84 7 Yes 
limited by 
84 84 83 6 US open open spectrum 
GROUP3 
limited by 
Austria open open spectrum 98 98 95/96 No 
Iceland open open 
limited by 
spectrum State control 
limited by 
Switzerland open open spectrum 98 98 98 State control 
GROUP4 
limited by 
Finland open open spectrum 93 93 <92 Yes 
New Zealand open open duopoly 90 90 3 Yes 
Outliers 
license license limited by 
Greece one linn one firm spectrum 2001 2001 93 1 State control 
Luxembourg open open duopoly 98 98 98 State control 
license license limited by 
Turkey one firm one firm spectrum 2006 2006 97/98 4 State control 
Sources: OECD Communications Outlook; OECD International Regulation Database 
Table 5.2: Market Structure, 1998 
Basic voice telephony: trunk Basic voice telephony: international Mobile cellular telephony: analogue Mobile cellular telephony: digital 
Number of I Share of largest I Share of second Number of I Share of largest I Share of second Number of I Share of largest I Share of second Number of I Share of largest I Share of second license holders operator largest operator license holders operator largest operator license holders operator largest operator license holders operator largest operator 
Groupl 
Belgium 7 100 0 7 100 0 1 100 0 2 67 33 
Denmark 8 95 8 75 1 100 0 4 53 
France 13 100 0 14 2 64 36 3 53 38 
Germany 21 100 0 21 100 0 1 100 0 4 44 43 
Ireland 1 100 0 1 100 0 1 100 0 2 65 35 
Italy 4 100 0 4 100 0 1 100 0 2 66 
Netherlands 3 80 3 80 1 100 0 6 64 30 
Norway 100 0 95 1 100 0 3 75 
Portugal 1 100 0 1 100 0 1 100 0 3 50 
Spain 3 97 3 3 97 3 1 100 0 2 70 30 
Group2 
Australia 11 82 16 11 63 22 2 70 30 3 48 33 
Canada 13 14 2 10 
Japan 15 64 21 64 18 51 30 51 
Sweden 15 83 15 68 1 100 0 4 49 
UK >20 76 10 7 49 16 2 4 34 
US 621 62 346 49 27 2 6 
Group3 
Austria 11 100 0 13 100 0 1 100 0 3 80 20 
Iceland 1 100 1 100 0 1 100 0 2 100 0 
Switzerland 12 100 0 12 100 0 1 100 0 3 100 0 
Group4 
Finland 20 55 40 16 66 24 1 100 0 2 69 31 
New Zealand 7 77 18 15 72 20 1 100 0 2 83 
Outliers 
Greece 1 100 0 1 100 0 0 3 53 47 
Luxembourg 1 100 1 100 0 0 2 100 0 
Turkey 1 100 0 1 100 0 1 , 100 0 2 75 25 
---
Sources: OEeD Outlook; Oeed International Regulation Database 
I 53 0 Tab e . : h' wners lp an dP' f f nva lsa Ion 0 fPTO 1998 s, 
PTO State shareholdings(%) Year of privatisation 
1992 1998 
Group! 
Belgium Belgacom 100 51 1995 
Denmanrk Tele Denmark 89 0 1992 
France France Telecom 100 62 1997 
Germany Deutsche Telekom AG 100 61 1996 
Ireland Telecom Eireann 100 80 1996-97 
Italy Telecom Italia >50 5 1998 
Netherlands KNP Telecom NV 100 43.8 1994 
Norway Telenor 100 100 
Portugal Telecom Portugal 100 25 1995 
Spain Telefonica 35 0 1997 
Group2 
Australia Telstra 100 67 1996-97 
Canada stentor 0 0 
Japan NTT >66 65 1986 
Sweden Telia 100 100 
UK British Telecom 22 0 1984 
US Baby Bells 0 0 
Group3 
Austria Post and Telekom Austria AG 100 100 1998 
Iceland Telecom Iceland 100 100 
Switzerland Swisscom 100 100 1998 
Group4 
Finland Sonera 100 78.8 1998 
New Zealand Telecom New Zealand 0 0 1990 
" Outliers 
Greece OTE 100 65 
Luxembourg PT Administration 100 100 
Turkey Turk Telekomunikasyon 100 100 
Average 79.4 54.3 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook; OEeD International Regulation Database 
T bi 54 P . 3 e 0 : nce R I f egn 3 IOn (R t 01) e 31 
Retail prices 
Basic voice telephony Mobile cellular telephony 
(trunk and international) 
I:;roupl 
objective benchmark objective benchmark 
Belgium Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to all operators 
objective benchmark 
Denmark Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO 
objective benchmark 
France Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
Discretionary (tariff approval) obj. bench.&cost of the operator 
Germany Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. Applies to the DOs 
objective benchmark 
Ireland Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
cost of the operator 
Italy Reg. applies to the DOs No regulation 
objective benchmark 
Netherlands Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Norway Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to the DOs 
objective benchmark 
Portugal Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
Reg. of some prices 
Spain Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
uroup~ 
objective benchmark objective benchmark 
Australia Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. applies to the incum. PTO 
objective benchmark 
Canada Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO No regulation 
objective benchmark (local) Reg. of some prices 
Japan Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. applies to all operators 
Sweden cost of the operator 
objective benchmark 
UK Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO 
~-,~ 
Objective benchmark (local) 
US No regulation 
uroup.j 
Discretionary 
Austria Reg. Applies to the DOs No regulation 
Iceland 
Trunk: Objective benchmark 
Switzerland Reg. Applies to the incumbent PTO 
uroup'l 
Finland No regulation No regulation 
objective benchmark 
New Zealand (residential) 
vUUlers 
objective benchmark 
Greece Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO 
. 
Luxembourg 
Discretionary (tariff approval) objective benchmark 
Turkey Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. applies to the DOs 
Source: OEeD secretariat 
T bi 54 P . a e . : nee R I f egu a .on (I t f n erconnec .on ) 
Interconnection or access charges 
Basic voice telephony Mobile cellular telephony Mandatory requirements 
(trunk and international) to publish intercon-
nection or access charges 
IlTroupl 
cost of the operator 
Belgium Reg. applies to the DOs Yes 
cost of the operator 
Denmark Reg. applies to the DOs No regulation No 
cost of the operator 
France Reg. applies to the DOs No regulation Yes 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Germany Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to the DOs Yes 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Ireland Reg. applies to all operators Reg. Applies to all operators 
objective benchmark objective benchmark 
Italy Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. applies to the DOs Yes 
Trunk:cost of the operator 
Netherlands Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Yes 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Norway Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to the DOs 
Portugal cost of the operators cost of the operators Yes 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Spain Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. Applies to all operators Yes 
ILTroup:t 
commercial agreement or access commercial agreement Or access 
Australia undertaking approved by regulator undertaking approved by regulator No 
Canada No regulation Yes 
objective benchmark objective benchmark 
Japan Reg. applies to all operators Reg. applies to all operators Yes 
cost of the operator cost of the operator 
Sweden Reg. applies to all operators Reg. applies to the DOs Yes 
objective benchmark cost of the operator 
UK Reg. applies to the incumbent PTO Reg. applies to the DOs Yes 
,. 
Obj. bench. & cost of the operator cost of the operator 
US Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to the ~Os Yes 
\.Troup.5 
cost of the operator 
Austria Reg. applies to the DOs No regulation Yes 
Iceland 
Switzerland Yes 
I \.Troup" 
Finland Yes 
objective benchmark objective benchmark 
Yes New Zealand Reg. applies to the DOs Reg. applies to the DOs 
IUuUlers 
Greece No regulation No regulation No 
Luxembourg 
Turkey 
cost of the operator 
Reg. Applies to the incumbent PTO No 
Source: OEeD secretariat 
Chapter 6_ 
New Zealand Telecommunications 
6.1 Economic Background of Deregulation for SOEs 
New Zealand is a small, open economy_ International trade is therefore of great im-
portance for the well-being of the New Zealand economy. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
pastoral products were the main source of export revenue, which made the New Zealand 
economy an easy prey to demand shocks that affect international commodity prices. In 
1974 and 1979 respectively, two major oil crises severely disrupted the normal function 
of the world economy and the New Zealand economy was no exception. The skyrocket-
ing oil prices pushed up all input prices, which had detrimental effects on both demand 
and supply sides of the economy. The two oil crises forced the world economy into re-
cession. The adverse effects continued into the 1980s. Britain's entry into the European 
Community and weak food commodity prices prevailing at the time hit New Zealand 
exports exceptionally hard. The New Zealand government initially confronted the prob-
lem by conducting policies that increased energy self-sufficiency, by seeking new export 
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markets and by promoting export product diversification. However, these policies were 
insufficient to restore the economy to its former strength. A large proportion of eco-
nomic activities, especially those that were not export-related, were under no pressure to 
perform well or to actively engage in efforts to reduce costs. This so-called x-inefficiency 
can been seen as "the difference between actual cost and minimum attainable cost re-
sulting from any reduction of the pressure on firms to apply maximum effort in pursuit 
of efficiency and profits ... is the difference between maximum and actual performance)) 
(Hay and Morris, p297). It was believed that eliminating such inefficiency among many 
industry sectors could strengthen the economy. Many companies in the private sector 
undertook major reforms of their organisations, production processes, and accounting 
practices, etc to lower inefficiency in their operations during that period. The poor eco-
nomic performance of government-owned enterprises was well known and they therefore 
were the targeted area for efficiency improvement. The government of New Zealand 
started to make amends by deregulating and privatising state-owned enterprises. The 
legal barriers that prohibited competitors from entering the market were removed. The 
:. government gave competition a crucial role in improving efficiencies and in increasing 
consumer surplus. Competition was introduced into many markets that were formerly 
dominated by a state-owned monopoly, including the telecommunications industry. 
6.2 First Telecommunications Industry Reform 
The only carner in the prOVlSlOn of public telecommunications services III New 
Zealand prior to the deregulation was the New Zealand Post Office. Its businesses 
included postal operations, telecommunications and banking. For telecommunications, 
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it enjoyed a statutory monopoly with vertical control over terminal equipment, local 
exchange services, and both national and international long distance services. In July 
1987, Touche Ross Management Consultants were commissioned by the government to 
report on whether competition should be introduced into the network industry by loos-
ening the government's strict control of the market. The main focus was laid on the 
possible net economic efficiency gains such changes might bring to New Zealand. Sev-
eral shortcomings of Telecom's operations were also identified in the report and greater 
competition was recommended. Those shortcomings included at least the following. Its 
operations were not market-driven; in comparison with other telephone companies over-
seas, it performed quite inefficiently and its management system was vastly inadequate. 
The existence of large cross subsidies implied the potential for large price reductions 
especially in the long distance markets with the introduction of competition. Follow-
ing the report, the government of New Zealand decided to introduce competition into 
telecommunications service network by allowing more network service providers to take 
roles in the market. 
On 1 April 1987, Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (Telecom) was formed by 
separating the telecommunications element of the New Zealand Post Office from the rest 
of its operations. The regulatory and policy advice responsibilities for telecommunica-
tions and radio spectrum management rested on the Department of Trade and Industry, 
which became the Ministry of Commerce on 1 December 1988 and, which became the 
Ministry of Economic Development in February 2000. From 1 October 1987 to 1 April 
1989, the supply of telecommunications customer premises equipment was progressively 
deregulated. On 1 April 1989, all legal restrictions on entry into the telecommunications 
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service market in New Zealand were removed. In September 1990, the government priva-
tised Telecom by selling it to a consortium led by Ameritech of Chicago and Bell Atlanta 
of Philadelphia. In November 1990, Clear Communications Ltd (Clear) was registered 
as a network operator. It then engaged actively in negotiations and in litigations with 
Telecom for interconnection agreements that would provide a "level playing field" for 
many years. With the conclusion of the first interconnection agreement in March 1991, 
competition was initiated. 
6.3 Regulatory Environment of First Reform 
New Zealand government adopted light-handed regulation for the telecommunica-
tions industry based on the concept that competition can carry out many functions 
often carried out by regulatory means, such as retail price regulation. The main fea-
tures of New Zealand's "light-handed" regulatory environment are described in what 
follows. The first feature is that there are no controls on entry. Obtaining a license is 
not compulsory for companies who intend to supply telecommunication services, and 
the number of network service providers allowed to enter the market is not constrained. 
However, it may be beneficial to obtain a "Network Operator Status", which presents 
the network operators with a right to apply for a court order if need arises when in-
stalling telecommunications plant on public and private property. The second feature 
is that there is no industry specific regulator. This has the advantage of saving the 
fiscal cost of a specific regulator. It allows concentration of expertise in the general 
enforcement body - New Zealand Commerce Conimission. Furthermore, the regulatory 
environment relies primarily on competition law, the Commerce Act 1986, to deal with 
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anticompetitive behaviour. The key provisions are the prohibition of mergers that create 
or strengthen a dominant position in a market (Section 47); exclusionary behaviour by 
dominant firms (Section 36); and agreements that substantially lessen competition (Sec-
tion 27). The Telecommunications Inquiry suggested the strengthen of the Commerce 
Act, for which the government decided to adopt. Section 47 will be used to prohibit 
mergers that have the effect of substantially lessening competition, rather than forming 
a "dominant position". This aligns section 47 with section 27 in application. Section 
36 will apply to any practices that might take advantage of an operator's substantial 
degree of market power, instead of merely focusing on the use of an operator's domi-
nant position. The applicability of the Commerce Act was widened by such a change, 
which gives it a greater role in preventing anticompetitive behaviour. The fourth feature 
of New Zealand's regulatory environment is that Telecom has to disclose information 
including the standard price, terms and conditions of a prescribed set of services of-
fered, offers of discounts in excess of 10% and interconnection agreements reached with 
its competitors. Starting from year 2000, Telecom is also required to publish twice a 
year the separate financial statements and financial performance measures for its "local 
loop" and "other telecommunications" businesses. The cost of complying with "Kiwi 
Share" obligations on a forward-looking basis has to be included in such publications. 
The disclosure of this information is meant to provide a supplementary role to assist 
interconnection negotiations. It is intended to redress problems of asymmetric infor-
mation between negotiating parties that produce unequal bargaining power. The fifth 
feature is that there is no price control, except in relation to domestic customers' access 
charges under the "Kiwi share" obligations. The "Kiwi share" prohibits Telecom from 
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increasing the real value of its pre-GST rental rate beyond its level in 1 November 1989 
unless the profits of Telecom are unreasonably impaired. The real price calculation is 
based on the All Groups Consumer Price Index (CPI), which can be obtained from 
New Zealand Department of Statistics. The sixth feature is that there is a threat of 
introduction of other regulatory measures, such as imposing price control. In December 
1991, the Minister of Communications issued a statement of its policy toward the devel-
opment of competition in telecommunications markets in New Zealand. The statement 
declares the government's goal to develop an efficient telecommunications industry and 
highlights the need to allow new entrants access to the incumbent's network. It requires 
the parties involved to make genuine efforts to reach an agreement on interconnection. 
If the current regulatory regime fails to deliver a satisfactory outcome relating to the 
government's goals further regulatory measures may be brought in . 
There was no industry-specific regulator to look after telecommunications industry 
from the first regulatory reform in New Zealand. The general regulatory duties were 
rested upon the Ministry of Economic Development, the New Zealand Commerce Com-
mission and the courts. The resource and network branch of the Ministry of Economic 
Development was responsible for advising the government on the regulatory policy for 
the telecommunications sector. The Commerce Commission, on the other hand, en-
forced the Commerce Act. Disputes between network service providers that could not 
be resolved through commercial negotiations were taken to the courts and tried on 
general competition law. 
It became clear that the implementation of light-handed regulations was not able 
to fully satisfy the New Zealand government's goals. This dissatisfaction arose mainly 
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because of the delay involved in reaching agreement or having the disputes settled by the 
courts. Therefore the government established an Inquiry to assess the current regulatory 
arrangements and explore amendments that might help to achieve the government's 
objectives, which are to "ensure that the regulatory environment delivers cost-efficient, 
timely, and innovative telecommunication services on an ongoing, fair and eq~itable 
basis to all existing and potential users". Details of the Inquiry and the government's 
decision concerning the change of regulatory regime will be discussed in greater length 
in Sections 6.8 and 6.9. 
6.4 First Interconnection Negotiations and Litiga-
tions (Clear vs Telecom) 
Clear was the first entrant and thus the first network service provider to negotiate 
interconnection with Telecom. It proposed that the interconnection charges should 
be based on incremental costs of providing the services, with payments between two 
;, companies on a reciprocal basis. Telecom proposed that interconnection pricing should 
be based on Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), also called Baumol-Willig (BW) 
pricing rule. According to ECPR, Clear would have to pay Telecom the incremental costs 
of supplying access plus any opportunity costs incurred caused by new entrants, which 
also include the incumbent's foregone monopoly profits. After long and frustrating 
negotiations, it turned to the courts for dispute resolution on the principles of pricing 
of interconnection. Clear sued Telecom on the grounds of violating the competition 
law. It intended to prove that Telecom was in breach of Section 36 of the Commerce 
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Act, which is concerned with the use of dominant position for exclusive behaviour. The 
litigations, which took five years starting from 1991 to 1996, were tried in three courts-
the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council. Telecom did not, in the 
eyes of the Privy Council, violate Section 36 of the Commerce Act by adopting ECPR. 
The Privy Council gave the use of ECPR as the basis of interconnection pricing a legal 
stand. After the ruling, a discussion paper by the Ministry of Commerce and Treasury 
noted "The BW rule was solely designed to achieve the goal of productive efficiency. 
In the simplest, static and no-uncertainty context the rule achieves this goal. However, 
if other factors are introduced such as uncertainty and sunk costs, or if the dynamic 
benefits of competition are considered, the BW rule may, in fact, deter efficient entry". 
It pointed out the long run economic side effects with arbitration supporting the use of 
ECPR. The government stated that it opposed to the use of ECPR because it had the 
potential to hinder competition. Under pressure from the government the access prices 
agreed between two participants at the end were less than implied by the ECPR. The 
directed costs of the disputes estimated and reported in the Inquiry's final report were 
NZD 5-10 million. 
6.5 Main Competitors of Telecom in Telephone Net-
work 
Clear was the main competitor of Telecom in long distance call market. It was 
therefore the main contributor in price reduction in telecommunications services in New 
Zealand. It held about 18% of the provision for domestic toll services and 20% of 
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international toll services. In mobile telephony, Telecom and Vodafone (or Bellsouth 
NZ prior to the acquisition in November 1998) operate the only cellular mobile tele-
phone networks in New Zealand. Telecom operates a combined first (analogue) and 
second (digital) generation network whereas Vodafone's network makes use of second-
generation technology only. Vodafone captures about 34 % of the mobile market. The 
first residential local wireline competition in New Zealand was initiated by Saturn in 
May 1998. Saturn entered the residential local telephony market by duplicating the 
local loop which enables it to compete with Telecom for local access. However, Saturn 
still had to interconnect with Telecom's local loop. Saturn's network is concentrated in 
the Wellington area. In April 2000, it merged with Telstra New Zealand to form a 50:50 
joint venture. The company, TelstraSaturn, entered into the Christchurch and Auckland 
markets to complement its Wellington network. 
In December 2001, both the Overseas Investment Commission and New Zealand 
Commerce Commission approved the acquisition of Clear by TelstraSaturn. The newly 
created entity is called TelstraClear. The integration process of the two carriers is 
expected to take around twelve months. TelstraClear will be the second largest full 
service carrier in New Zealand. 
The relationship between carriers is not clear-cut. They may compete with each other 
in prices and quality of final services in order to attract a greater customer base; they 
may form alliances in order to extend their networks and/or to provide more services 
to their customers. Carriers would like to be able to provide their customers with a full 
range of services to meet any needs that may arise. They can also bundle their services 
to extract greater profits. This one-stop-shopping concept underlies the movements of 
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alliances and mergers in the industry. 
The relationship betweel). the entrants and the incumbent, Telecom, is somewhat 
hostile. Telecom is the sole supplier of the entrants' essential intermediate input 
interconnection. The entrants are Telecom's customers and also its competitors. The 
competitive environment for final services tainted the seller-buyer relationship of the 
incumbent and the entrants. The pricing principles and terms and conditions for inter-
connection proposed by Telecom would severely disadvantage the entrants. The entrants 
have recourse to the courts to solve the problem, but the courts may not have the ex-
pertise for the task. The years-long litigation creates tension in the industry. 
6.6 Key Benefits of the Reform 
The Ministry of Commerce (now called the Ministry of Economic Development) in 
its 1995 study lists four major benefits for telecommunications services from the the first 
regulatory reform. The first benefit is that advanced services are now available, such as 
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), frame relay, call diversion, interactive voice 
response systems, audio and video conference services; 0800 toll free calls and 0900 pay 
calls are convenient for business' sake. Furthermore, more personal services are avail-
able for normal network users, including call minder and the initial offering of Personal 
Communications Service (PCS). The second benefit is that the reform has brought in 
large capital investments by network providers. Total capital investment in telecom-
munications by Telecom, Clear and Bellsouth from 1987 to 1995 exceeds NZD6, 600 
million. The ongoing investors in the telecommunications market are primarily BCL, 
Global One, Clear, TelstraSaturn (or TelstraSaturn), TeamTalk, Telecom NZ, Vodafone 
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and WorldxChange. The third benefit is that the customer services such as customer 
inquiry answering services and fault clearance have greatly improved. The fourth and 
last benefit is that prices have been largely reduced since early 1991 and more price 
plans are available to the customers. 
Outside the four key benefits mentioned above, the boost in the telecommunications 
industry has brought a great many employment and business opportunities. The in-
dustry has trained its employees and this has enriched New Zealand's human resources. 
The better and more advanced telecommunications services have allowed New Zealand 
to lessen its geographical isolation. New Zealand businesses can conduct business with 
overseas companies with ease. Furthermore, the benefits brought by the flow of infor-
mation and knowledge are invaluable. 
The improvement in the variety of services available and the decline in prices have 
greatly increased consumer welfare. Boles De Boer and Evans (1996) have estimated 
the productivity and changes in consumer and producer welfare in the New Zealand 
telecommunications network market between 1987, when it was deregulated, and 1993. 
The surplus gain for residential customers is estimated to be 251.7million-307.93 mil-
lion and the surplus gain for business customers is estimated to be 287.3million-348.02 
million (data are in 1987 prices). The capital investment has secured the future devel-
opment of the telecommunications industry. The network service providers tailor their 
services to meet both general and specific market demand for niche markets. Maurice 
Williamson in his speech (Minister of Communications) for New Zealand Telecommu-
nications Summit commented on the productivity improvement: "Major operational 
efficiencies have been reached ... for a start, Telecom's productivity has soared. From 115 
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lines per operating employee in March 1991, it has reached 250 in March 1996". It is 
clear that the goal of greater production efficiencies was met since deregulation. 
6.7 Price and Productivity 
The OECD has established a methodology for comparing t€lephone charges across 
OECD countries. This methodology is based on a representative basket of component 
services and quantities in telephony. According to the November 1999 results, New 
Zealand has the sixth lowest residential prices and the twenty-second lowest business 
prices among the twenty-nine countries. Furthermore, New Zealand has the seventeenth 
lowest mobile prices among the twenty-seven O~CD countries offering mobile services. 
Since high ranking means high tariff for that service, there is still room for the price of 
business telephone and mobile services to fall. Although the reform has brought vast 
benefits to society, the international comparison suggests that further benefits can still 
be obtained. Therefore, more measures are required to intensify competition. 
Some complaints about the old regulatory regime are widely discussed among economists, 
competing network operators and government officials. It is believed that settling dis-
putes by courts is time consuming and the resolution process of this kind can be used 
by the incumbent to deter and delay entry. The cost of litigations is high and the uncer-
tainty surrounding the industry before the final verdict is enormous. These factors have 
adverse effects on the creation of effective competition. A modification of the existing 
regulatory regime that can resolve technical problems and disputes in a timely fashion 
may bring higher benefits in the future. 
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6.8 Telecommunications Inquiry 
In February 2000, the government established a Ministerial Inquiry to examine reg-
ulatory arrangements for the New Zealand telecommunications sector. Although the 
broad aim of the Inquiry was to assess the extent to which the old regulatory regime 
meets the government's objective for the telecommunications sectors, there were spe-
cific issues that the government would like examined. These issues include the follow-
ing. The Inquiry should examine the environment for interconnecting supplies with 
Telecom's network; it should look into the Kiwi Share Obligations and to upgrade and 
redefine necessary stipulations so that they were applicable in today's environment; it 
also has to examine what way or form of regulation would best suit to arrange the tele-
phone number portability and administration. A three-person team chaired by Hugh 
Fletcher ran the Inquiry, which adopted a public consultation process. It proposed 
a light-handed industry specific regulation, for which the Electronic Communications 
Commission should implement the framework. The appointment of a commissioner 
that deals directly with industry disputes concerning designated services is also new to 
the current regulatory regime. The proposed regulatory regime is designed to encourage 
industry self-management. It recommends, but does not mandate, that the industry 
establish a forum for that purpose. The Inquiry also proposed strengthening the Com-
merce Act, especially section 36 and 47. It recommends that the Kiwi Share Obligation 
should be better defined and embodied in legislation. 
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6.9 Proposed Changes to the Old Regulatory Regime 
Upon receiving the report of the Telecommunications Inquiry, the government gave 
the following decisions concerning the recommendations of the Inquiry on 20 December 
2000: It decided to appoint a Telecommunications Commissioner to act as an industry-
specific regulator within the Commerce Commission. The costs of the operation will 
be funded by the industry. The key functions of the Commissioner will be to resolve 
disputes over regulated services; to report to the Minister of Communications on the 
desirability of regulating additional services and; to monitor and enforce Kiwi Share 
Obligations (KSOs). An industry forum will not be mandatory, but is expected to 
be established. The Commissioner can approve the code of practice for the forum. A 
regulated price will only be set if there is a dispute over the price that the parties cannot 
resolve themselves. A point should be noted: the Commissioner does not have the power 
to overturn commercial negotiations. 
To ensure that minimum regulation is adopted, the government decided to follow the 
Inquiry's recommendations of a hierarchy of regulatory tools. On the top of the hier-
archy are the designated services, i.e. services that the Commissioner requires Telecom 
to provide to anyone seeking access to them. Initially, such services included intercon-
nection to Telecom's fixed telephone network, wholesaling of Telecom's fixed network 
services and number portability, including 0800 number portability. Telecom and the 
applicants (other carriers) can agree on how these services are priced, but if no agree-
ment is reached, the Commissioner sets the prices using specific pricing rules. These 
rules include the "cost-based rule" (total service long-run incremental cost) and "bill 
and keep" for interconnection and "retail minus cost saved" for wholesale access. The 
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Telecommunications Commissioner or the Minister of Communications can initiate a 
process to add services to the list of designated services. Lower on the lauder are .ser-
vices the designation of which is deferred until some deadline to allow the industry to 
resolve the issues that are needed to be resolved without having to regulate them. The 
Commissioner will designate these services only if by the deadline the industry has not 
reached an agreement. On the bottom of the hierarchy are specified services, i.e. services 
that must be provided upon request. The disputes around these services should involve 
no prescribed pricing principles. No service was initially specified. 
The process for resolving disputes will be as follows. In relation to a designated 
service where the price is in dispute, the Commissioner will apply "initial pricing prin-
ciples" to make a determination on price quickly. This determination is binding and 
not subject to appeal to the High Court. A party could then seek a "pricing review 
determination". Three Commissioners from the Commerce Commission, including the 
Telecommunications Commissioner, will make full determination pricing reviews jointly. 
The determination will engage the application of the "pricing review principles" which 
involves more complex methodology. An appeal may be allowed on full pricing review. 
The rights of appeal will be limited to points of law, to co-exist with a right to judicial 
revIew. 
The Telecommunications Bill 2001 was introduced by the Minister of Communica-
tions five months after these decisions were made. This legislation was designed to carry 
out the government's decision as its response to the Inquiry. After the first reading of 
the Bill, it was referred to the Commerce Select Committee (Parliament) for considera-
tion, the Committee recommended a shorter time frame for the Commerce Commission 
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to make a determination or a decision and designation of fixed to mobile pre-selection 
from Telecom's network as a multinetwork service, etc. The government introduced 
Supplementary Order Papers (SOP) in November 2001 to amend the Bill in relation 
to the recommendations of the Committee. More services were specified in SOPs as a 
result. The Bill was passed a month later. Changes have been made to the Bill and 
therefore its contents were a bit different from the government's decisions made at the 
end of the year 2000. 
The new regime adds a layer of industry-specific regulation to complement the generic 
competition regime under the Commerce Act. The regime is designed to avoid inefficient 
and overuse of the courts and therefore reduces the risk of having the incumbent dragging 
out the process. 
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Chapter 7 
Failure of Voluntary Negotiation as 
Explained by the Coase Theorem 
In the old regulatory regime, agreements on interconnection between the incumbent 
and the entrants were always difficult to achieve by voluntary negotiations. The gov-
ernment expected that most disagreements could be solved by commercial negotiations 
and the courts were the last resort which should not be used often. In reality, the old 
regulatory system did not work as the government expected. Negotiations could not 
bridge the differences between interconnection seekers and provider. They turned to 
the courts to solve their problems more often than the government would like. Telecom 
had no incentive to allow entry and Clear needed interconnection, which put Telecom 
in a superior bargaining position. In this chapter, the incentive for Telecom to nego-
tiateis examined according to the Coase Theorem, to give insights into why voluntary 
negotiation did not work in New Zealand. 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, p73) restated the Coase Theorem as follows: "a change in 
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a liability rule will leave the agents' production and consumption decision both unchanged 
and economically efficient within the following (implicit) framework: (a) two agents to 
each externality bargain, (b) perfect knowledge of one another's (convex) production 
and profit or utility functions, (c) competitive markets, (d) zero transactions costs, (e) 
costless court system, (f) profit-maximising producers and expected utility maximising 
consumers, (g) no wealth effects, (h) agents will strike mutually advantageous bargains 
in the absence of transactions costs". The violation of its assumptions may render the 
Coase Theorem not applicable in the real world. 
In the old regime, the government of New Zealand practised hands-off policy in in-
terconnection issues in the telecommunications industry. This means that the telecom-
munications industry is fully deregulated and all markets are open to entry. It intends 
to give competition the important role of regulating the market. The government only 
interferes when competition is under threat. The idea is that incumbent and entrants 
would negotiate and reach the optimal interconnection charges, which would lead to effi-
cient outcomes. Voluntary negotiations have high priority and courts or other regulators 
" cannot overturn the agreements reached. When the parties involved reach no consensus 
over interconnection issues, they may then turn to the courts for dispute resolution. 
However, the government preserves the right to introduce further regulatory measures 
such as price regulation if voluntary negotiations cannot deliver satisfactory outcomes. 
Three major parties are either directly or indirectly affected by the level of intercon-
nection charges: the incumbent, the entrants and the consumers. However, consumers 
cannot and/or may not be willing to take part in negotiations. The reason for consumer 
non-participation arises from the high transaction costs of coordination of differential 
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interests. Only two parties, the incumbent and the entrants, are left to negotiate for the 
interconnection fees. Therefore, the gain in consumer surplus of a prospective lOwer in-
terconnection fee are ignored unless some entities (eg. government or consumer groups) 
are willing to step in to present the consumer interests. 
It is clear that the government believes the efficiency proposition of the Coase Theo-
rem: "when parties can bargain together and settle their agreements by cooperation, their 
behavior will be efficient regardless of the underlYing rule of law" (Cooter and Ulen, 1988 
p105). However, the government ignores the lack of incentive of the incumbent to in-
terconnect with the entrants and thereby to allow access to the network. The lack of 
incentive to negotiate stems from there being no mutual gains from trade. Therefore, 
voluntary negotiations cannot assist in setting optimal interconnection charges. This 
conclusion is drawn from comparing the monopoly profits with the sum of duopoly 
profits in what follows. 
7.1 Monopoly Game without Consumer Participa-
tion 
Without the entrant (Clear), the incumbent (Telecom) enJoys monopoly profits. 
Assume linear demand function, P = a - bQ, and a constant marginal cost, c. The 
profit-maximising problem of the monopolist is: 
(7.1) 
The value for Q that solves the problem is: 
(7.2) 
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Solve for P: 
P = a _ bQm = a + c 
2 
and the profit-maximising level of profit is: 
1r* 
m 
(a - C)2 
4b 
7.2 Duopoly Game without Consumer Participation 
With the new entrant (Clear), the firms play the duopoly game. Assume that each 
firm acts non-cooperatively with zero conjectural variation. Thus, each is on its reaction 
function and the equilibrium is identified as the intersection of the two reaction functions. 
Suppose that two firms producing a homogeneous product with constant marginal and 
common cost, c. The market price, P, depends on the sum of production by two firms, 
Q = ql + q2· The profit of each firm, 1ri, depends on its own output, qi. The linear 
inverse demand function becomes P = a - b(ql + q2). The profit of each firm i E{l, 2} 
equals maximising decision: 
maX1rl = [a - b(ql + q2) - C]ql (7.3) 
qi 
The Nash equilibrium is 
* * a - c ql = q2 =--3b 
The market price is: 
P __ bQ _ a+ 2c -a m- 3 
The Nash equilibrium profits are 
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and the total profits is the sum of the two firms' profits: 
The graphical representation of the analysis is in figure 7.1. 
P 
a 
Demand: P = a - bQ 
a+c 
-2- 1----\-----">-
c 
R 
f Q 
Figure 7.1: An Illustration of Incentives for Monopoly and Duopoly Market Structure 
Comparing the monopoly profits (area B + C) with the duopoly profits (area C + E), 
it is clear that monopoly profits are greater, 1fm > 1fc . Therefore, the entrant is unable 
to compensate the incumbent for its loss resulting from providing interconnection. This 
means that the incumbent would prefer to be the only seller in the market and earn 
monopoly profits. It thus has an incentive to deter entry by denying and/or delaying 
the interconnection. This is the main reason why voluntary negotiation cannot work as 
efficiently as the government wishes. In this example, consumer benefits are not taken 
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into account in negotiation because of the significance of transactions cost. The agents 
therefore cannot strike mutually advantageous bargains. 
Other assumptions concerning the Coase Theorem are violated in the the context 
of New Zealand telecommunications negotiations. The first problem is asymmetric in-
formation. Each carrier has the incentive to own private information and to use it 
to its own advantage at the expense of the others. Although the government requires 
the publication of interconnection relevant information to assist in future negotiations, 
asymmetries in information still persist. The production and profit functions of each 
operator are unknown to the others and to the regulator, this violates the perfect infor-
mation criterion. 
Furthermore, the incumbent has market power. The sources of the incumbent's 
market power are listed in Chapter 3, which may include supply side economies of scale 
and scope, demand side economies of scope and its vertically integrated structure, etc. 
The incumbent's superior market power renders the "competitive markets" criterion 
unachievable in nature. 
In the old regulatory regime in New Zealand, if commercial negotiations could not 
deliver agreements, carriers could use the courts as a backstop to resolve disputes. The 
court dispute resolution system has proven to be both costly and time consuming. This 
violates the assumption of a costless court system. Relying on voluntary negotiation 
cannot deliver efficient outcomes in the New Zealand context. The externalities plague 
the negotiation process. 
The government can act as a representative for consumers to internalise the positive 
externality. It can impose regulation or threaten to introduce stricter regulation. This 
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reduces the transaction costs associated with consumers' direct involvement. However, 
the drawbacks of such an approach are many. For example, the large administrative costs 
for government intervention have to be paid, for which consumer welfare is reduced. It 
is also controversial whether the government has the knowledge and ability to decide 
what is the best for consumers. 
7.3 Duopoly Game with Consumer Participation 
Assume that there are no transaction costs and therefore consumers can also take 
part in negotiations. Comparing the consumer surplus (CS) under monopoly (area 
A) with CS under duopoly (area A + B + D) gives: (a;~)2 < 2(a~c)2. Consumers 
would therefore prefer the duopoly situation. In the first model where consumers are 
ignored, the incumbent has no incentive to provide interconnection. It is interesting 
to investigate whether or not the consumers, whose CS is greater under duopoly, can 
bribe the incumbent to provide access willingly. The total welfare under monopoly, the 
monopoly profits plus the CS under monopoly, is 3(a;c)2 (area A + B + C). The total 
welfare under duopoly, the sum of the profits of the two firms plus the CS under duopoly, 
is 4(a9~c)2 (area A + B + C + D + E). Due to the higher total welfare under duopoly, the 
consumers are able to compensate the incumbent for the loss of providing interconnection 
services. If the government can act as a mandatory in interconnection negotiations for 
the consumers with transaction costs that approach zero and other assumptions are 
more or less satisfied, the efficient outcome may be achieved by voluntary negotiations. 
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Chapter 8 
Comparisons and Evaluation of the 
Two Regimes 
The two regulatory regimes resulting from the first and second regulatory reform 
in telecommunications in New Zealand are compared. Comparisons of the two regimes 
are made to assist understanding of the change of setting introduced in the new regime 
and what problems of the old regime were targeted to be solved by these changes. 
Evaluation is made for both regimes. The details of the new regime have not been 
sorted out, therefore the evaluation is based on information that is currently available. 
There are two main sections in Chapter 8. Section 8.1 compares the old and the new 
regulatory regimes in telecommunications in New Zealand. The comparisons section is 
further divided into four main aspects: institutions, governing laws, dispute resolution 
process, and others. The first three are the areas where the changes have been the 
most significant. The other issues include redefining of the Kiwi Share and the industry 
forum. Section 8.2 evaluates the two regimes. This section is meant to address the 
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problem of the old regime and to second-guess the potential problems that might plague 
the new regime based on the theory of regulation. 
8.1 Comparisons 
The second regulatory reform in telecommunications in New Zealand brought in 
some institutional and functional changes. The reform was aimed at improving the 
social and economic goals of the government. I compare the two regimes to analyse the 
differences of the two regimes to achieve better understanding of the goals of the New 
Zealand government 
8.1.1 Institutions 
Figure 8.1 shows the regulatory structure in New Zealand before and after the second 
reform. The dashed lines and square display settings of institutions or processes that 
were not in place prior to the reform. The New Zealand parliament passed legislation 
such as the Commerce Act and the Telecommunications Act that govern the industry. 
The Minister of Communications reports to the Parliament on his/her administrative 
performance. The Commerce Commission takes up an enforcement role in the regulatory 
system. It acts to ensure the compliance of the Commerce Act and the Fair Trading Act 
by the industry. The Ministry of Economic Development provides policy advice to the 
Minister of Communications. The independent judiciary provides the operators with 
another channel to go against the judgements of the regulatory chain, which consists of 
government departments and crown entity. The respective competencies and the change 
of responsibility of the three main regulatory institutions in New Zealand - Ministry of 
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Figure 8.l: New Zealand regulatory structure. Source: APEC Regulatory Outlook 
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Economic Development, Commerce Commission, and courts are outlined below. 
The Ministry of Economic Development can be seen as the policymaker in the New 
Zealand regulatory regime either before or after the second reform. It is responsible 
for the provision of policy advice to the Minister of Communications on the social and 
economic goals of the government in the telecommunications sector. The Minister of 
Communications is a member of the Cabinet, and he/she is a part of the collective 
decision making process of the government. He/she is also responsible for the progress 
of industry relevant legislation through Parliament. Competencies of the Ministry of 
Economic Development did not change after the reform. 
The New Zealand Commerce Commission is the regulator in the New Zealand reg-
ulatory regime. It administers general competition law to ensure competitive environ-
ments. The Commission regulates competition issues arising in all sectors including the 
communications sector as there is no sector-specific regulatory agency in New Zealand. 
The Commission consist of one chairman and five commissioners. Under the Telecom-
munications Act 2001, a Telecommunications Commissioner is appointed within the 
Commission. The activities of the Telecommunications Commissioner are funded by 
the industry. He/she has access to specialist staff to assist him/her with more techni-
cal issues. The major responsibilities of a Telecommunications Commissioner cover the 
following three aspects. For a start, he/she has to resolve disputes over the regulated 
services. The services which have been regulated at the beginning of the new regime are 
of crucial importance to competition. In the new regime, the Telecommunications Com-
missioner takes over a large proportion of dispute resolution burdens from the courts to 
reduce the misuse of courts. The second key function of the Telecommunications Com-
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missioner is to report to the Minister of Communications on the desirability of regulating 
additional services. Another key function of the Telecommunications Commissioner is 
to monitor and enforce Kiwi Share Obligation, which includes the administration of the 
funding payments from the industry and the quality of the universal service. In the new 
regime, more tasks are entrusted to the Commerce Commission. 
In the old regime, courts were heavily relied upon for dispute resolution. This was 
against the government's intention of minimising the use of regulatory institutions. 
Matters involving the prices or the terms and conditions of interconnection were sel-
dom settled by commercial negotiations. The numerous litigations among operators 
created tension in the industry. Therefore, in the new regime, the use of courts is lim-
ited. Appeals against decisions of the Commerce Commission are restricted to matters 
of administrative law/administrative review, rather than decisions of the Commission. 
The same is expected to apply with decisions of the Telecommunications Commissioner. 
Determinations of the Commissioner on regulated services are subject to appeal on ques-
tions of law (and questions of fact) in limited circumstances. The new regime shifts the 
decision making responsibility of regulated services that are in dispute to the Commerce 
Commission. Therefore, disputes over regulated services are no longer under the charge 
of the courts. 
8.1.2 Governing Laws 
The most important law that governs the conduct of operators in the telecommu-
nications industry is the Commerce Act 1986. This generic law has been applied in 
many cases to prevent anticompetitive behaviour of the market participants. In the 
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second reform, the Commerce Act was strengthened to give the Commerce Commission 
more teeth and to bring New Zealand in line with Australia. A larger number of firms 
and markets would therefore come under the jurisdiction of the Act. The maximum 
penalty for offences in terms of breaching the Commerce Act by body corporate has 
been doubled to encourage operators to act in accordance with the Act. 
The Telecommunications Act 1987 removed restrictions on the supply of telecom-
munication equipment and services to implement the full deregulation policy of the 
government. The Telecommunications Act 2001 was legislated to introduce further reg-
ulatory measures. These measures include the appointment of a Telecommunications 
Commissioner, the designation and specification of certain services and the clarification 
of the Kiwi Share Obligation. The time frames and procedures that the Telecommuni-
cations Commissioner must adhere to when making a decision or a determination were 
outlined in the 2001 Act as well. Although the 2001 Act has been enacted, the 1987 
Act remains in place. However, the new Act includes certain provisions of the 1987 Act, 
particularly those relating to the registration and operation as a network operator. 
8.1.3 Dispute Resolution 
In both regimes, industry participants are encouraged to determine their own terms 
of supply via negotiations. Parties may only seek determination from the Commissioner 
in relation to a designated or specified service if they have negotiated the term of supply 
for these services with reasonable effort. The determinations of the Telecommunications 
Commissioner do not have the power to overturn commercial agreements. 
Compared with the old regime, the new regime provides greater incentives for net-
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work service providers, especially the incumbent, to engage in serious negotiations. In 
the old regime, when commercial negotiations failed, parties involved could sue the other 
for breaching the law (normally, it is the entrants who sued the incumbent). It has been 
proven by past history that it was very difficult to judge the defendant guilty when 
the Commerce Act did not specify the range of activities that were considered offensive 
especially when the information was not perfect. This situation could be worked to the 
incumbent's benefit. If the misuse of the incumbent's market power went unpunished, 
the actions of the incumbent could be led by false incentives. More anticompetitive 
business practices could be adopted as a result. 
In the new regime, however, if the incumbent is being deliberately difficult in nego-
tiation over regulated services, the other party can seek help from the Commissioner, 
who is a specialist in the industry. The Commissioner would adhere to certain pre-
scribed rules in making a determination. Judging by the government's choice over the 
prescribed pricing rule in interconnection, the entrants were favoured under the new 
regime for more intense competition. 
8.1.4 Others 
Kiwi Share is a contractual agreement between the Crown and Telecom that enables 
the government to meet its social objectives in telecommunications. Under the origi-
nal Kiwi Share, Telecom has to maintain a free calling option for ordinary residential 
telephone service, charge no more than the standard residential rental for ordinary res-
idential telephone service and continue to make ordinary residential telephone service 
as widely available as at 1 November 1989. The original Kiwi Share was implemented 
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over a decade ago. At that time, the use of personal computer was not as common as 
it is now, and therefore internet services were not included. Nowadays, access to data 
service is important for a knowledge economy, and therefore the Kiwi Share has to be 
upgraded to ensure access to the Internet service. The enhancements to the Kiwi Share 
will assist the delivery of the government's objective - to benefit more consumers. The 
upgraded Kiwi Share requirements include the following. The new, clarified definition of 
local calls include standard calls to the Internet as well as fax calls. Telecom was asked 
to extend its network coverage to current levels. Telecom has to upgrade its network 
in order to bring basic Internet access to virtually all New Zealanders. Telecom is also 
required to meet detailed service quality measures and to report to the Crown and the 
Telecommunications Commissioner. The agreements do not require Telecom to offer 
free of charge new types of Internet call traffic that might emerge based on new Internet 
capacity. This may cause problems in the future as to the proper definition of free local 
calls. 
It was decided that an industry forum will not be mandatory. However, the gov-
ernment expects one to be established. Many major network service operators in New 
Zealand have expressed their willingness to join the forum. The Telecommunications 
Commissioner can approve codes of practices for the forum. 
8.2 Evaluation 
The New Zealand regulatory regime appears to be technology neutral and seems to 
avoid impeding the introduction of and access to new services and technologies. The 
regulation in New Zealand aims at prevention, not intervention. This is the idea of "as 
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much market as possible and as much as government as necessary". The emphasis of 
such a light-handed approach is on establishing a policy and regulatory environment 
that is sufficiently flexible to meet new issues that might emerge from the fast-changing 
environment of the telecommunications industry. 
Compared with other countries, the New Zealand telecommunication industry has 
been under-regulated with its full deregulation policy. Under this regulatory environ-
ment, the entrants have had to fight a bitter battle with the incumbent for a market 
share. Although New Zealand telecommunications industry has performed well regard-
ing price reduction, ongoing investments and improved services, the government believe 
that better performance could be achieved with fiercer competition. The ineffectiveness 
of the competition implied further regulatory measures should be considered. The area 
that caused greatest discontent in the old regime was the way disputes were settled. 
When commercial negotiations failed, cases were often taken to the courts. Courts are 
not considered appropriate regulators when right or false was not the only issue involved. 
Judgements from the courts may ignore the economic consequences they cause and the 
government's policy goals. Therefore, the courts cannot provide a planned policy for 
the development of the industry. 
Recognising problems of the old regime, the government mandated a telecommuni-
cations inquiry to prepare for the second regulatory reform. In the new regime, the 
dispute resolution function of the courts over regulated services is largely replaced by a 
Telecommunications Commissioner. The Telecommunications Commissioner has to be 
a specialist with good knowledge of the industry and regulation. It is believed that an 
expert of the industry would be in a more appropriate position than the courts to make 
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decisions on matters in dispute. The government's policy regarding competition and its 
social goals can be implemented through the actions of the Commissioner. 
The time frames for making a determination were set to prevent unnecessary delays. 
A determination is binding during judicial review to prevent the misuse of the courts. 
The Telecommunications Commissioner makes decisions or determinations alone or in-
volves two other Commissioners in the Commerce Commission. This provides an op-
portunity for peer review and a pool of expertise over important issues. However, does 
such arrangement guarantee the delivery of consistent determinations? When three 
commissioners have different opinions over an issue, who has the right of the final ver-
dict? Does the regulator have to justify his/her decision to parties seeking determination 
from the Commissioner? Should the quality of the Telecommunications Commissioner's 
performance be assessed? If yes, how is this done? 
Determinations over regulated services have to be consistent to assist the industry 
in forming expectations. This will help to reduce uncertainty surrounding the indus-
try and thus will assist in making timely investment decisions. The consistency needs 
to be secured even with the change of a Telecommunications Commissioner and when 
making determinations among commissioners. It is not clear yet who has the superior 
determination power when three commissioners are in disagreement on issues over a 
regulated service. Do their opinions have the same weights? If the Telecommunica-
tions Commissioner is given superior power, will the choice of person to fill the role 
of Telecommunications Commissioner affect the regulatory and industry policy? The 
Telecommunications Commissioner serves a five year term of office, and the contract is 
terminated if he or she does not perform his/her tasks. The procedures of assessment 
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for his/her performance quality have not been established. 
The government has decided on a set of prescribed pricing rules of interconnection 
when the price is in dispute . These prescribed pricing rules are cost-oriented and are 
better for the entrants than the incumbent. It might be a worry if the entrants were not 
cooperating in negotiations in order to push for a determination from the Telecommu-
nications Commissioner since the prescribe pricing rules may lead to a determination 
that favours the entrants . However, a similar worry would arise if the determination 
favoured the incumbent. 
The Commerce Commission is currently seeking submissions from interest parties 
and industry experts . Many details of the new regime are not yet clear. Therefore the 
evaluation is not complete. However, judging from the changes that are known to the 
public , I would expect it to work better than the old regime especially with its ability 
to increase competition. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis addresses issues of regulation of the telecommunications industry. Reg-
ulation is the rule-of-the-game which all industry players have to follow. Players who 
violate the rule are punished for their misconduct. The rule-of-the-game is, therefore, of 
crucial importance to the distribution of power between players and the form and extent 
of competition. Competition can have great influence on productive efficiency and con-
sumer welfare. Therefore, the way these rules are set affects the success of competition 
and the achievement in economic efficiency. 
The Telecommunications market has expanded rapidly in recent years. It plays an 
important role in the economy of many developing and developed countries. The grow-
ing importance of this industry has attracted attention from governments. The basic 
idea underlying government intervention through regulation is to provide. an environ-
ment that is appropriate for the development of effective competition. The benefits 
of introducing competition into the telecommunications industry have been proven by 
many single or cross country studies. Governments would like to ensure that competi-
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of international organisations. The OECD and APEC have undertaken many studies of 
regulation and telecommunications services performance in recent years in answer to the 
requests of their member countries. These studies have shed some light on the choice 
of regulatory measure that generally delivers good telecommunications performance. 
The second problem is that indices constructed to represent regulatory regimes may 
not be objective and controversies arise as a result. The way indices were chosen and 
constructed may affect the analysis and lead to different conclusions. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the positive link connecting the removal of legal 
barriers to entry and the telecommunications performance. Countries who opened up 
their telecommunications industry for competition in the 1980s and 1990s have enjoyed 
outstanding telecommunications performance compared to those countries who are just 
starting to open or have not yet opened their markets for competition. Most of the early 
movers have chosen not to maintain heavy regulation at the same time. The relatively 
light regulation of the most liberalised country group is characterised by fewer legal 
limitations on the number of competitors allowed in the market, low state shareholdings 
of the PTO's share and special voting rights, higher privatisation of major PTO's and 
fewer restrictions on the number of foreign operators in the domestic market. 
Competition has not been effective in New Zealand under the old regulatory regime. 
The government of New Zealand believes that consumers would benefit more if com-
petition can be intensified. The regulatory experiments over the past decade suggest 
that regulation in New Zealand might be too light. There are not enough restrictive 
measures in place to properly constrain the behaviour of market participants. The vol-
untary negotiations did not work as effectively as envisaged by the government. The 
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incumbent was able to delay or deter entry with lengthy litigations. This fact justified 
the second regulatory reform in New Zealand. 
The second regulatory reform in New Zealand attempted to change the operators' 
incentive to negotiate especially over regulated services. Under the new regime, a 
Telecommunications Commissioner was appointed to resolve disputes concerning reg-
ulated services. The choice of services to be regulated are based on their importance 
to competition. The government can, therefore, ensure that the delay in introducing 
these services, owing to the fact that no agreements are reached between operators, can 
be eliminated within a reasonable time period. It is interesting to observe the shifts in 
regulatory power from the courts to the Commerce Commission. This change, however, 
should be welcomed by operators other than the incumbent. 
How much power a Telecommunications Commissioner has is not yet clear to me. 
What are the prescribed rules a Telecommunications Commissioner has to follow or ap-
ply while making a determination? Issues such as accountability, due process and the 
expertise of the Telecommunications Commissioner become important under the new 
regime. They are important because the monitorer of the industry may need to be mon-
itored while his/her decisions may have significant effects on the market. This is not to 
say that the government should constantly supervise the performance of the Telecom-
munications Commissioner. What I mean is that a procedure has to be established for 
assessment to avoid the principal-agent problem. 
The evaluation of the new regime can be expanded once the details of the way this 
regime works are established. Sorting out all these details, however, may take several 
years. Clear has expressed interest in applying determinations from the Telecommu-
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nications Commissioner on matters related to interconnection with Telecom's network. 
However, the newly appointed Telecommunications Commissioner will not be in. New 
Zealand until March 2002. I would hope that this case can give us ideas of how this new 
system functions. If pricing is in dispute, what would the Telecommunications Commis-
sioner do in terms of choosing pricing principles? Observations obtained from cases that 
require the attention of the Telecommunications Commissioner can enrich the practical 
aspects of the evaluation of the new regime. I would also like to verify whether or not 
under the new regime voluntary negotiation works better than under the old regime in 
achieving agreements given more time. 
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